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The British had been taken by surprise by the American colonists’ rebellion in 1775 but a powerful army had driven the rebels out of New York City in 1776. Hoping to deal the rebellion a fatal blow, Lieutenant General William Howe had captured Philadelphia, the capital of the colonies, in September 1777 but instead of a capitulation, the main rebel army reformed and continued to fight. Worse, a British army under Lieutenant General John Burgoyne surrendered to Major General Horatio Gates at Saratoga on October 17. This victory convinced France to enter into a formal alliance with the American colonies, thus completely transforming the strategic situation. Troops were taken from the army in the American colonies to protect other colonies, which necessitated abandoning Philadelphia. Howe’s successor, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, was forced to retreat during a battle at Monmouth Courthouse the following year, and found himself locked up in New York City. The American army lacked the ships and cannon needed to force its way in, so the war in the north reached a stalemate in 1779.

However, British leaders believed that the South was overflowing with loyalists who would flock to a British army. 8,500 soldiers under the command of Clinton sailed from New York City on December 26, 1779, and the troops landed near Charleston, South Carolina on February 11, 1780. Charleston fell after a lengthy siege on May 9 and the capture of its garrison of 5,000 men meant that a rebel army no longer existed in the south. Clinton returned to New York City with half of the army, leaving Major General Charles Cornwallis to establish control of South Carolina in preparation for an invasion of North Carolina. Shortly after taking command of American forces in the South, Gates led a second army to destruction at Camden on August 17. Cornwallis began to prepare to move into North Carolina but partisan bands had sprung up all over South Carolina and the loyalist force guarding his left flank was crushed at King's Mountain on October 7. Major General Nathanael Greene replaced Gates on October 14, and divided his forces, sending half of his army under Brigadier General Daniel Morgan to threaten South Carolina, while he blocked an invasion of North Carolina.

Morgan had 300 Maryland and Delaware Continentals (regular troops), 200 Virginia militia who were ex-Continentals and 80 Continental dragoons under Colonel William Washington, as well as 120 North Carolina militiamen under General William Davidson. Cornwallis believed that if he could defeat this army then he would finally be free to move into North Carolina but he seemed to have forgotten that Charleston had been captured and two American armies had been defeated, and yet the partisans had only grown stronger. Worse, the attempt to organize an army of loyalists to guard his left flank had ended in disaster when a powerful force of over 1,000 Tories were crushed at King's Mountain on October 7. Furthermore, first Major James Wemyss and then Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton himself had failed to destroy Francis Marion’s partisans. Instead, Lieutenant Colonel Light Horse Harry Lee and his Legion of 300 cavalry and infantry were sent by Greene in December to join Marion and make life difficult for the British left to occupy South Carolina.

In January, Cornwallis sent Tarleton to keep Morgan away from his army, and defeat him if possible. Tarleton had 250 infantry and 200 cavalry of the British Legion, 250 Highlanders, 250 Royal Fusiliers and 50 artillerymen with two light cannon. When Washington’s scouts found Tarleton less than ten miles behind the rebels on the evening of January 16, Morgan realized that he would not be able to get all of his troops across a nearby river before dark. Instead, he decided to camp at Hannah’s Cowpens, a local landmark, and wait for 360 South Carolina militiamen under Andrew Pickens, an extremely capable, if not charismatic, partisan leader.

Battle of Cowpens
After talking with his officers Morgan knew that Tarleton’s record was based on savage, headlong charges against inexperienced troops. Aware that the militia could not be expected to face redcoats, he decided to use their reputation of fleeing as soon the shooting started to his advantage. Cowpens was a meadow 500 yards long by 500 yards wide where cattle grazed. The meadow appeared to be flat but there were actually two small rises, and Morgan placed his Continentals and 200 Virginia militiamen with Washington’s 80 dragoons in reserve, partially hidden by the rises. 300 militiamen under Pickens were positioned 150 yards in front of the Continentals, with another 100 militia on their right and a final 120 sharpshooters as a skirmishing line. Morgan wanted the militia to fire two volleys at fifty yards and soften up the British by taking out officers and sergeants. Immediately after the second volley, the militiamen were to move back and form on the left of the Continentals. The idea was to lure the British into a trap where they would be worn down by each line until they were vulnerable. The army had swelled to almost 1,000 men, but Morgan spent the night going from campfire to campfire to personally explain what he wanted and why it would work.

The British arrived on January 17 around 7AM, exhausted from chasing the rebels, while the Americans were rested and had eaten breakfast. The terrain seemed perfect for cavalry, so Tarleton hastily prepared an attack without consulting his two main infantry commanders. He had 1,076 men, but rebel sharpshooters quickly made him call off the first cavalry charge, so he committed most of his infantry to an attack, keeping 250 Highlanders and 200 cavalry as reserve. Tarleton’s two small cannon were firing steadily at the rebel line as the British advanced, but Pickens kept the militia steady. The difference in marksmanship soon became apparent. The British volley had little effect while the rebels took a heavy toll of officers and sergeants. When the militia retreated after their second volley, Tarleton saw an opportunity and sent dragoons to attack the militia, but Washington’s cavalry easily pushed them back.

After a brief pause to dress their lines, the British infantry advanced to trade volleys with the Continentals but when the Continentals stood firm, Tarleton sent the Highlanders to move around the right of the American line and outflank them. A mistake in orders had the men on the right of the American line turning around and marching to the rear. Accustomed to American troops panicking, the British troops charged only to have the Continentals quickly turn and fire at almost point blank range. The Continentals then charged and for the first time British regulars were forced to retreat by American troops using bayonets. Seeing the Continentals pushing the redcoats back, the militia also charged, and the exhausted British regulars collapsed. Tarleton was hated throughout the South for failing to stop his troops from killing soldiers that had surrendered. Despite many men shouting “Tarleton’s Quarter” Morgan and his officers refused to permit the massacre of any British troops. The remaining British infantry, the Highlanders, were soon surrounded but they continued to fight. However, the 200 cavalry in reserve actually refused Tarleton’s order to charge and relieve the infantry, so he was forced to retreat. By 8AM the only British left on the field were dead or had surrendered.

Only 14% of the troops escaped, so Cowpens was a major defeat for the British. 110 were killed, and 712 captured. American casualties were roughly 200. Tarleton’s unbeatable reputation disappeared and he was shown to be a brave cavalry leader, but not an effective leader of large units. Since the rebels lacked artillery, he could have softened up the enemy with an extended bombardment instead of attacking right away.

Morgan knew that he did not have time to celebrate his victory because Cornwallis was nearby, and would be coming after him as soon as he heard the news, so he started retreating at noon. He also sent a report to Greene, who called in Lee and Marion, and then went on his own to meet Morgan.

Needless to say, Cornwallis was filled with fury when he learned that his army had shrunk from 3,200 to 2,550 men in one day. Fortunately, a thousand reinforcements arrived the same day as news of the defeat. Cornwallis set off in pursuit of Morgan but when he learned that the rebels were two days ahead of him, he had his baggage train burned, including the officers’ fine china, to increase the troops’ pace.

Greene had his own problems. The men of the Virginia militia had reached the end of their enlistment and despite the passionate appeal of their commander, Brigadier General Edward Stevens, only a few agreed to stay with the army.
 
Both armies were moving slowly because the rain had turned the roads to mud, so the troops slogged their way forward through knee deep muck. However, Greene’s men managed to stay a day ahead of the British, and after they linked up with the other half of the army at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina on February 7, they were joined by Light Horse Harry Lee and his 280 men. By this time Morgan was too ill to continue. Greene wanted to fight Cornwallis but many of his men were in bad shape, so all of his senior commanders, including Morgan, recommended continuing to retreat. Greene’s advance planning paid off and he was able to stay ahead long enough to reach Virginia before the British could catch up.

This was a crucial victory, since Greene’s army could now obtain supplies and reinforcements, while Cornwallis had burned his baggage train and was 240 miles from Camden, his nearest supply base. Greene knew that he had to go back and fight the British, but he had lost most of his North Carolina militia and had not replaced them with enough Virginia militia. The army began moving south when Lee was sent to link up with Pickens, who was still in North Carolina. At the same time, Cornwallis sent Tarleton with 450 men to escort Tory militia that were coming to join the British. Lee’s cavalry were dressed like British dragoons and they found the 400 Tories first, who believed that they had run into Tarleton as planned. Lee later said that he intended to give the Tories the option of surrendering but fighting started before he could reach the commander, Colonel John Pyle. With the cavalry only a few feet from the Tory infantry, it was a slaughter, and 90 Tories were killed, some apparently after they surrendered. The battle soon became known as Pyle’s Massacre and ended any hope of recruiting a loyalist army in North Carolina.

The rebel army re-entered North Carolina on February 22 but Greene continued to have problems with the militia. In early March, the South Carolina and Georgia militia decided to march home, since they had been gone for two months. Pickens was sent to make sure they made it back safely, thus depriving Greene of one of the most effective partisan leaders. Fortunately, 1,000 North Carolina militia, 400 Virginia militia and 400 raw Maryland Continentals arrived on March 10 and 11, so he began marching for Guilford Courthouse on March 12.

The Battle of Guilford Courthouse
Guilford Courthouse was Greene’s preferred battlefield. It was a slightly rising field 1.5 miles long and 1-1.5 miles wide with a road that curved slightly because of the slope. The field had little hills and enough underbrush that the British would not be able to maintain the lines that struck such terror in the hearts of the militia, while the underbrush would provide cover for the militia. Getting Cornwallis to fight was no problem, he was running out of food, and he was down to 2,000 men because of death, illness and desertion, so he knew he had to beat Greene soon.

The battle took place on March 15. Greene had 4,400 troops, but only 1,700 were Continentals. Following the same strategy that Morgan had used at Cowpens, Greene placed his troops in three lines. Since the 1,000 North Carolina militiamen were his least reliable troops, they were put in the first line, behind a split-rail fence at the edge of the woods, and he also put riflemen on each flank. Although he lacked Morgan’s charisma, he went down to the North Carolina militia to explain what was at stake and how they could win if they could just fire two volleys. Next were 1,200 Virginia militia 300 yards behind the first line, hidden by the woods. Their commander, Brigadier General Stevens, was so ashamed that they had run at Camden that he put 40 riflemen behind them with orders to shoot anyone who ran. The third line was 1,400 Continentals 550 yards behind the second line, in front of the courthouse.

The British arrived about 1:30 PM. Cornwallis did not care how many Patriots there were or what the terrain was like, he only knew that he was finally going to fight Greene. The British were hungry, they had just marched 12 miles, and they were outnumbered but they were ready to fight. The militia took a heavy toll of the advancing redcoats but they broke after exchanging a point blank volley at forty yards. They had given their two volleys but without a leader like Pickens or Morgan to steady them, they simply threw away their weapons and ran to the rear. Fortunately, Stevens had warned his Virginia militiamen to expect a mob of screaming men to come running towards them, and just let them through, which they did. The woods succeeded in breaking up the British lines and made it difficult for them to use the bayonet, but the British regulars proved to be more adaptable than thought and quickly cleared the woods of the Virginia militia, although they took heavy casualties. The British troops that emerged from the woods to see the Continentals waiting at the end of a clearing were tired after fighting through two lines. The commander of the first battalion, Lt. Col. James Webster, made the mistake of not waiting for the rest of the army, but charged at the veteran Maryland and Delaware Continentals who waited calmly and then ripped the redcoats apart with a precise volley at 100 yards. While the wounded Webster was regrouping his troops, another British battalion, the 2nd Guards, emerged and charged a raw regiment of Continentals, who immediately broke and ran. The Maryland Continentals turned to block the Guards and were exchanging fire with them when Washington’s dragoons smashed through the Guards, breaking their ordered lines. This enabled the Maryland Continentals to charge with bayonets, and the British regulars and Continentals quickly became a chaotic mass of men struggling to kill each other.

When Cornwallis made it to the clearing he saw that the British army was on the verge of defeat, so he ruthlessly ordered the cannon to fire grapeshot into the mass of struggling men in order to force the two lines apart, betting correctly that the redcoats’ discipline would enable them to reform faster. Shortly after, more British battalions arrived at the clearing, giving Cornwallis hope that he could finally destroy the rebels. However, Greene knew that he had already punished the British severely, so he used his reserve to cover the orderly withdrawal of the army. Since the rebels retreated, it was a British victory, but British casualties were 506 against 330 Americans. Following Tarleton’s defeat at Cowpens, Cornwallis now had 1,400 soldiers, who were in no shape to pursue the rebels. Some might criticize Greene for not continuing the fight and finishing off the enemy, but he understandably had no desire to lose a third army in the south. Furthermore, almost a thousand militiamen had abandoned the battlefield, which reduced his numerical advantage over Cornwallis.

The British army stayed at Guilford’s Courthouse because they had nowhere else to go, and most of the men lay on the ground in the pouring rain that night and the next day because there were too few houses. The British certainly did not look like a victorious army, so they failed to win many Tory recruits or obtain badly needed supplies. There were supplies at Camden but Camden was 150 miles away and more importantly, several overflowing rivers would have to be crossed. In addition, the British would have to fight their way through partisan bands with Greene’s troops shadowing them looking for an opportunity. Instead, Cornwallis chose to go to Wilmington, North Carolina, 200 miles away on the coast, where he could re-establish contact with the navy. The army left Guilford Courthouse on March 18 and finally reached Wilmington on April 7.

Greene knew that he had a precious opportunity to eliminate another British army. However, he lost his Virginia militia because their enlistment time was up and Virginia’s governor refused to provide Greene with more militia because he feared a British attack on Virginia by Benedict Arnold.

After a couple weeks were spent recovering, Cornwallis led his army to Virginia to link up with the 5,500 British troops near Chesapeake Bay. Although he was abandoning the Carolinas, he hoped that conquering Virginia would achieve the “domino effect” of eliminating the source of supplies for Greene’s army, thus setting the stage for the pacification of the Carolinas. This strategy depended on Greene following the script and following him into Virginia but Greene had other plans.

The Patriots Retake South Carolina
A small force was left to keep an eye on Cornwallis, while the rest of the army moved to South Carolina. There were 8,000 British and loyalist troops in South Carolina but they were scattered at various posts. Greene reached Camden on April 19, and he had 1,500 men, most of whom were Continentals. The army camped at nearby Hobkirk’s Hill and Greene hoped to draw the British out to battle because he did not have enough troops to properly surround Camden. Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon obliged even though he only had 900 men, and launched an attack on the morning of the 25th. At first, the Americans held steady and their artillery was pushing the British back, but confusing orders caused the Maryland Continentals, Greene’s most experienced troops, to break. Enough troops stayed firm to prevent a rout but the rebels had to retreat from the field. In the end, Greene was an exceptional theater commander but he lacked the tactical judgment needed for a good battlefield commander.

After repeatedly failing to lure Greene into battle on conditions that favored the British, Rawdon evacuated Camden and retreated to Monck’s Corner, only thirty miles from Charleston. He then ordered the garrison of Ninety Six to abandon the fort and join the garrison at Augusta, although the message never reached Ninety Six. Once the news of Rawdon’s retreat spread, it became the happy hunting time for the partisans. Thomas Sumter forced Orangeburg’s garrison of 85 Tories and regulars to surrender on May 11, while Lee and Marion used fire arrows to drive 150 troops out of Fort Motte. News of Marion’s approach caused the garrison of Georgetown to retreat on May 23 and Lee captured Fort Granby by allowing its Tory commander to march out with his accumulated loot. Since Fort Granby was located in Sumter’s territory he threw a hissy fit, even though he had twice failed to take it, and he threatened to resign until Greene calmed him down. By this time Augusta and Ninety Six were completely isolated, so Lee was sent to join Andrew Pickens and Elijah Clarke against Augusta, while Greene moved against Ninety Six. Augusta actually had two forts and the weaker fort was stormed on May 23 but it took almost two more weeks to break though the second fort’s defenses, which left only Ninety Six.

The success of this whirlwind campaign was due to the smooth cooperation between Greene and the partisan leaders, namely Marion, Pickens and Clarke. The campaign would have been even more effective if Sumter, the official commander of all South Carolina militia, had not refused to follow Greene’s strategy. Sumter had launched his own campaign during February and March but his attacks on Fort Granby, Belleville and Fort Watson were all failures that had cost him a quarter of his men.

Post Ninety-Six was called that because it was originally an Indian trading post 96 miles away from the key Cherokee town of Keowee. It was garrisoned by 350 Tory regulars and 200 South Carolina militiamen under the command of Colonel John Cruger, who had built a strong, well-designed fort. Greene had 850 Continentals and 200 militiamen but he had no stomach for the heavy losses that would be needed to storm the fort, so the siege began on May 22. An active commander, Cruger made life hell for the American troops digging the trenches needed to approach the fort safely. Once the fort’s water supply was cut, things looked bad for the defenders but Rawdon had slipped past Sumter and Marion. Forced to hurry up his schedule, Greene launched a direct assault on June 18 but the attack failed after a fierce battle, and he abandoned the siege the next day. Thirsting after a decisive engagement, Rawdon pushed his troops hard after Greene but the British regulars had marched for days in the brutal summer heat while wearing heavy uniforms. When the number of deaths caused by heat exhaustion passed fifty, Rawdon finally faced reality and abandoned the chase, returning to Post Ninety-Six to oversee the evacuation.

Once Rawdon divided his troops it was Greene’s turn to shadow him. However, even though he finally managed to convince Sumter and Marion to join him, when he found Rawdon’s force dug in at Orangeburg, it was the Patriot troops who were too exhausted for a serious battle. Instead, Greene retreated with his main force to an area where the men could rest, while leaving the cavalry and the partisans to keep the British off balance. Once Rawdon knew that Greene had retreated he withdrew to Charleston, so that the only British troops left in all of the Carolinas and Georgia were at Charleston, Wilmington and Savannah. In late August, exhaustion forced the twenty-seven year old Lord Rawdon to give up his command and return to England.

When Greene left with the main force, he assigned Marion and Lee to serve under Sumter, who wanted to clear the British from Monck’s Corner. On July 17, Lee and Marion encountered the 19th Regiment under Colonel John Coates, who tried to retreat to Charleston but had to make a stand at the Quimby plantation, whose buildings made a good defensive position. Aware that a direct attack would be too costly, Lee and Marion decided to wait for cannon. Unfortunately, the cannon were delayed so Sumter ordered one of his officers, Colonel Taylor, to make a direct attack. Despite support from Marion, the attack failed with heavy casualties. This last example of incompetence was too much for the other leaders to stomach. Lee simply took his Legion away the next day to rejoin Greene, Marion returned to his usual hunting grounds and Taylor was so furious that he refused to ever serve again with Sumter. Faced with such a public humiliation, Sumter disbanded his force and retired to North Carolina.

Cornwallis and the 1,500 remaining soldiers of his army linked up with the British force in Virginia under Benedict Arnold. Like many senior British officers, he had little use for Arnold but the 5,000 troops were very appealing. He quickly used them to launch raids across Virginia, forcing the 3,000 men under Lafayette and Major General Steuben to retreat. Tarleton returned to his true specialty, executing lightning raids against the Virginia legislature, and Governor Thomas Jefferson barely avoided capture. Believing that the Americans and French would combine to push him out of New York City, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to prepare a base in the Chesapeake Bay, where his troops could be picked up by the navy in preparation for a new offensive. Cornwallis chose Yorktown and moved towards the port in early July. Aware that the rebel army was following him, Cornwallis set a trap which Lafayette walked into on July 6. Although the advance force under Brigadier General Mad Anthony Wayne was able to avoid destruction, Lafayette did not press the British as closely afterwards.

Eutaw Springs
Fortunately for the Patriot cause, Greene’s army was ready to take the field again by August 22. He had about 2,400 men, made up of 1,250 Continentals, 300 dragoons under Washington and Lee, 150 South Carolina militia, 150 North Carolina militia, 300 partisans under Pickens and 250 partisans under Marion. Greene’s army found 2,000 British regulars and Loyalist troops, the last British army in the Carolinas, under Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart at Eutaw Springs on September 8. By this time, the militia and partisans had become hardened soldiers, who kept their ranks while exchanging volley after volley with the British to Greene’s pleasant surprise. The British line was eventually broken but many troops retreated to nearby buildings. After two hours of steady fighting in the intense heat, the Patriot soldiers could not resist the temptation of rum found in the British camp and the soldiers quickly degenerated into a drunken mob. The British troops were too exhausted to take advantage of this opportunity, so Greene’s officers managed to organize a retreat. The battle had been an especially bloody one, even by the standards of the Southern campaign. American casualties were 514 against British casualties of 861. Stewart then retreated to Charleston, thus abandoning the countryside.

Yorktown
Supporting the rebellion was a heavy drain on the French treasury, so Washington was told that the campaign had to end the war or the rebels would have to continue fighting without French support. Although Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte du Rochambeau had agreed to serve under Washington, he was a much more experienced general and preferred to attack the British army in Virginia, rather than waste troops in a deadly assault on New York City. Washington felt that even if Cornwallis would stand and fight, British control of the sea would enable Clinton to reinforce him. However, Washington changed his mind when he realized that Clinton would be ready for any assault, and clearly had enough troops to hold the city even against their combined forces. More important, he learned in mid-August that Admiral Francois-Joseph-Paul Comte de Grasse was coming to the Chesapeake Bay with a fleet of thirty French warships and 3,000 soldiers, but he would leave after two months. If it seems as if Washington was being guided towards an offensive against Yorktown, that is because he was. Rochambeau had sent a message to de Grasse pressing him to concentrate on the Chesapeake but Washington grudgingly embraced the plan and arranged to keep the movement south secret from the British.

Cornwallis struggled to fortify Yorktown in the blazing August heat, or rather he drove his 7,000 troops but he soon concluded that the position had been a bad choice, since a proper defense required fortifying both sides of the York River. On September 3, an army of 5,000 French and 2,500 Continentals marched through Philadelphia, while enough troops had been left at New York to convince Clinton that he was the target.

Aware that a fleet had sailed from France to the colonies, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves had led his fleet from New York to search for the French. However, the French fleet had reached Chesapeake Bay on August 31 and landed 3,000 troops before the British ships arrived on September 5. After a bloody but indecisive battle, Admiral Graves did not aggressively seek another battle, which enabled de Grasse link up with a small fleet of French ships from Rhode Island. Outgunned by the combined fleet, Graves decided to return to New York, leaving Cornwallis on his own. Despite his orders to leave before October 15, de Grasse assured Washington that he would remain until the end of October.

The Franco-American army reached Yorktown on the evening of September 28. Cornwallis had not expected to face a combined American-French army and lacked the extensive fortifications needed to hold out for long, so he placed his hopes in the belief that Clinton would relieve him. The heavy artillery arrived on October 6 and the bombardment commenced three days later. Under the cover of the bombardment, the troops moved the trenches closer to the town each day. On October 16, Cornwallis tried to evacuate his army across the river and somehow make their way to New York but a powerful storm commenced after a third of the men had been transported across. Since the Americans had occupied the other side of the river, the British troops returned to Yorktown and abandoned any hope of escape. Graves’ ships needed to be repaired but Prince William, King George’s third son, had arrived in New York and two days were lost arranging parades and parties. A fleet gathered at New York City to transport an army to relieve Cornwallis but did not leave until October 19. Unfortunately, Cornwallis had surrendered on October 17, so 8,000 British, Hessian and Loyalist troops became prisoners.

Greene had hoped to retake the offensive but his men were exhausted and morale was almost rock bottom because many of them had not been paid in two years. Despite the victory at Yorktown he did not immediately receive reinforcements, so he did not return to the field until the middle of November, when he kept the British bottled up in Charleston but he lacked the reinforcements and artillery needed to besiege the city.

Charleston, New York City and Savannah were still under British control but it was clear to everyone in the British government aside from the king that the war was over, which enabled the peace party to win control of Parliament the following February, although a formal peace was not signed until September 3, 1783.

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Related Movies:

The Patriot (2000)
Directed by Roland Emmerich, starring Mel Gibson and Heath Ledger
A peaceful farmer, haunted by his savagery during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), wants to remain neutral during the American Revolution but the death of his son drives him to become a guerrilla. (please click here to read the review)

Further Reading:

The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas-John Buchanan, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997.

The author’s descriptions of the terrain show that he has spent a great deal of time visiting historical sites in the Carolinas, which bring the terrain to life for the reader, although the overly detailed descriptions can be a bit distracting at times. Although it focuses on the Carolinas Campaign (February 1780 to August 1781), the author provides brief but insightful biographical sketches and portraits of all of the major leaders in the South on either side in order to provide more depth. It is not a one stop examination of the Carolinas Campaign since it ends with the battle at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, hence the name. Buchanan is the rare historian who is an excellent researcher and an entertaining writer, and he has produced a superb book that sets the standard for other works in the field.

This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782. John S. Pancake, The University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1985.

As the title states, the book concentrates on the campaign in the South but it also gives a brief yet insightful recapitulation of the American Revolution from 1775 to 1780, which explains that the French entry into the war in February 1778 meant that the Revolution had become part of a global war, therefore the British had fewer resources to devote to suppressing the rebellion. Unlike The Road to Guilford Courthouse, which limits itself solely to the campaign in North and South Carolina, Pancake also shows that the British failed to learn from their abortive attempt to conquer Georgia in early 1779, which was due to their inability to recruit sufficient militia to hold a large area without the support of British regulars. This lesson would be painfully re-learned in the Carolinas. Pancake also provides a quick explanation of the limitations of the main weapons used in the Revolution, examines what made the redcoat so formidable and looks at the evolution of the Continental Army into a trained, professional army that was capable of facing British regulars on equal terms. This background information is similar to that provided in 1777: Year of the Hangman, which he also wrote, and while it is useful, it occupies a quarter of the book, so there is less time to spare for the personality conflicts that made the war in the south so fascinating.

South Carolina and the American Revolution-A Battlefield History-John W. Gordon, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2003.

The author is a former professor of history at the Military College of South Carolina, therefore he is well-suited for the subject. Given his background, it comes as no surprise that he provides an excellent explanation of how armies fought in the 18th century. Since Gordon covers every single battle during the entire war in South Carolina from the beginning of the Revolution in 1775 until the British surrendered Charleston, their last stronghold, in December 1782, in 184 pages, his discussions of individual battles are necessarily brief. What makes the book stand out among a crowded field is his examination of how the war in South Carolina was truly a civil war, even more so than the actual Civil War almost a century later, since there were no clear geographical divisions. Instead, the conflict was a savage war fought by guerrillas on both sides, punctuated by formal battles between standing armies. In the end, the Americans won in South Carolina because their generals, namely Nathanael Greene and Daniel Morgan, learned best how to work in tandem with the guerrillas. My main complaint is that the maps fail to do what they are supposed to do, namely present the strategic situation in visual terms, instead they only show where the battles took place within each state.

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