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British military planners had believed since the beginning of the war that Louisiana was a particularly weak target since it had only been purchased from Napoleon by President Thomas Jefferson in 1803. In addition, New Orleans was a vital commercial hub because it was the only port for exports produced by Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio. Admittedly, the wealthy French Creoles who owned the plantations that surrounded the city had only contempt for the Americans but they hated England even more since it was France’s enemy.

When Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, head of the North American naval station, had first proposed the invasion of Louisiana through Mobile, Alabama in June 1814, he had expected that the British would recruit thousands of Indian allies. However, any hope of attracting large scale Indian support ended on March 27, 1814 when Major General Andrew Jackson crushed the Red Sticks, Creek Indians who had been waging war against white settlers and any Creeks who refused to join them. He also strengthened the defences around Mobile, therefore a British invasion attempt was easily repelled on September 12. Convinced that the British had been supporting the Red Sticks from Spanish held Florida, Jackson invaded Florida in early November and drove out the British.

These setbacks caused the British to switch their invasion target to New Orleans, which involved daunting logistical problems, since the eastern approach to the city crossed an unmapped mix of bayous, creeks and swamps. The Mississippi River blocked any attack from the west of the city, while a powerful fort made an approach up the river extremely dangerous. The most likely attack route was to sail from the Gulf of Mexico to Lake Pontchartin, fifteen miles northeast of the city, where only a weak fort defended the river that connected the city and the lake.

Needing local allies, in early September the British attempted to purchase the allegiance of the Laffite brothers, Jean and Pierre, the leading operators at Lake Barataria, forty miles south of the city, the center of smuggling in the Caribbean. Despite an offer of the rank of captain in the British navy, $30,000 and land in Louisiana, Jean was unwilling to give up smuggling, and he arranged to have the offer delivered to Governor William Claiborne. Having devoted a great deal of energy to eradicating the smugglers, Clairborne was naturally suspicious, regardless of their popularity among the local population. A raid on the Laffite’s camp captured numerous smugglers on September 16 but the brothers vanished into the swamps.

Confident that Mobile could repel any attack and believing reports that indicated that New Orleans was the British target, Jackson arrived in the city on December 1 with fifteen hundred men. However, he was not pleased to learn that aside from one battalion of free blacks and another of Creoles, the city had failed to produce any other volunteers. Realizing that it would be impossible to guard every single bayou and stream, he assigned troops to block the waterways in order to reduce the number of routes, wait until it was clear which route would be used by the British and then place all of his forces there. Any suggestion that the black troops should be treated differently than white troops was met with anger, but Jackson refused to even consider the idea of cooperating with the Laffites. Leading citizens of the city arranged for the state legislature to suspend the charges against the smugglers for four months but it took a personal appeal from Jean in early December to win Jackson’s respect. Three companies of badly needed artillery were easily raised and Jean’s familiarity with the local geography would prove invaluable.

However, time was running out, since the British fleet reached Lake Borgne, which bordered Lake Pontchartin, on December 12. Forty five barges captured the five American gunboats left to guard the lake during a two day operation where the lack of wind greatly favored the British. Lieutenant General Sir Edward Pakenham, the brother-in-law of Wellington, had been given the command following the death of Major General Robert Ross outside Baltimore, but he was still on his way with part of the army. Major General John Keane was in charge and he had a total of 5,500 men.

Although the defeat of the gunboats was not welcome news to Jackson, he finally knew that New Orleans was the target, so he immediately summoned reinforcements. Impatient with the local government’s inability to recruit soldiers, Jackson declared martial law on December 16, which meant that every able-bodied male was required to serve in the militia, and many of them were sent to help defend the numerous approaches to the city. General John Coffee reached New Orleans on December 20 with the 800 men of the Baton Rouge garrison, and General William Carroll’s appearance the next day with more than 3,000 Tennessee militiamen naturally raised the citizens’ spirits.

Lacking the shallow draft ships needed to sail across Lake Pontchartain, it was decided to land at Bayou Bienvenue, which originated in the east of the city. It took five days to ferry all of the troops and supplies across Lake Borgne to the temporary base at Pea Island, and then they were rowed another thirty miles to the bayou. This was a very risky approach since aside from a dangerously long supply line, there were only enough boats to transport half of the troops at a time. The first elements of the army reached the mouth of the Bayou Mazant, which led to a solid road that ended at the Mississippi River ten miles from the city, on the evening of December 22. By late morning, the advance troops had captured the plantation of General Jacques Villere, which bordered the Mississippi. Fortunately for the Americans, Villere’s son escaped but Jackson had already been told that British boats had been seen near Lake Borgne, so he sent two officers to examine the British camp on December 23, and they saw that there were only 1,600 troops.

Keane’s subordinates suggested that he immediately march on the city, since it appeared that Jackson had been taken by surprise, but he decided to wait for the rest of the army, which was the problem with sending the army in a piecemeal fashion. In Keane’s defense, the men were on the verge of collapse, while his supply line was extremely fragile.

Although Jackson worried that the small force was a feint, he seized the opportunity to destroy part of the army while it was divided. Carroll’s men were left in the city as a reserve, while he led Coffee’s troops and several local militia units, roughly 2,100 men, to engage the enemy. Keane’s patrols failed to notice that an army was on its way and mistook the armed schooner Carolina for a merchant ship, so they were stunned when it began bombing their camp at 8pm. Despite the shock of the night attack, the British were able to hold their ground and by 9:30pm Jackson had accepted that he would not be able to force the redcoats to retreat, especially since the second brigade of British troops began arriving towards the end of the battle.

Although the entire British force had reached the plantation by the evening of December 24, the aggressive nature of the attack convinced Keane that he faced a powerful army, so he left the Americans alone. This enabled Jackson to begin building a strong defensive line behind a small canal, which had less than a mile of land between the river and a huge swamp.

Unknown to either Jackson or Keane, that same day peace negotiators signed a treaty in Belgium that ended the war.

Pakenham had earned a reputation as a decisive, aggressive commander in the Peninsular War but when he arrived on December 25 he was so disgusted by the British position that he was tempted to start over from a new direction. Several historians have suggested that he only agreed to move forward when Cochrane mocked him by saying that he would lead his sailors and marines to do the job if the soldiers retreated. However, he decided to first eliminate the American schooners that had been steadily bombarding the camp. On the morning of December 27, British gunners quickly set the Carolina on fire and the Louisiana retreated to a position near the main defensive line.

A probing attack on December 28 ended quickly because troops were being cut to pieces by fire from the line and the Louisiana. Actually, the part of the line further from the river lacked the covering fire from the schooner, so Pakenham has been criticized for not making a determined assault on that side and simply accepting the casualties rather than giving Jackson more time to dig in, as well as construct batteries on the opposite side of the river. Instead, the sailors spent three miserable days lugging cannon across the lake and up the creek to the British position. However, the emplacements were not strong enough for a three hour long artillery duel, so all that was accomplished was that a number of the British cannon were damaged and most of their ammunition was used up. Once again, Pakenham had chosen to not send troops against the weaker part of the American line while his cannon were providing cover fire. Instead, he waited for the third brigade under Major General Lambert, which arrived on January 4.

Pakenham decided to send 1,400 men to attack Jackson’s batteries on the other side of the river and eliminate the deadly crossfire that had shredded his army, which left him with about 4,400 redcoats for the main assault, against the 4,000 troops manning the American line. Unfortunately, unexpected delays meant that the main attack had already started by the time the first 440 men had made it across on the morning of January 7. The commander of the American position figured out that an attack was coming but Jackson did not have any reinforcements to spare.

Although he knew that the other attack was considerably behind schedule Pakenham continued as planned, since his bold attitude had won victories in Spain against experienced French troops. Three columns were to attack the line, one near the river, one near the far end of the line and one in reserve. However, the regiment responsible for bringing the ladders and fascines needed to cross the ditch and scale the fortifications was delayed because its commander felt it was a suicide mission (he was later court-martialed). As a result, the troops attacking on the far right end of the line were stuck in front of the fortifications and were cut to pieces by cannon and muskets firing at point blank range. Pakenham had to take command of the regiment but he received several wounds and died minutes later. In an attempt to avoid defeat, the reserve of 900 highlanders was marched into the battle and was almost immediately slaughtered. His second-in-command, Major General Samuel Gibbs, died while trying to rally an attack and Keane’s wounds were so serious that he was taken from the field. In fact, so many senior officers were cut down that there was no one to lead the men forward, so most either ran or stood their ground under the walls and died. Three thousand men had launched the attack but less than a thousand made it back to their camp unscathed after only twenty-five minutes of heavy fighting.

There were many reasons for the failure of the attack. The individual parts of the attack were badly coordinated, there was no covering fire to occupy the defenders until the troops got close enough to climb the walls, the ladders did not arrive in time, and most important, the diversionary attack had not even started, so the murderous crossfire was still there. Furthermore, the American army contained a large number of veterans and while they would probably have had difficulty facing British regulars on an open field, standing behind solid walls was a different matter entirely.

While the Americans were celebrating their victory, the badly armed, exhausted troops guarding the isolated battery were easily broken. Jackson sent reinforcements to drive the British back and the huge losses of the main assault meant that the surviving senior British general, Lambert, had no stomach for another fight, so he ordered a retreat.

British casualties were 2,037, including 291 dead, 1,262 wounded and 484 prisoners. American casualties were 71, mainly from the battery on the other side of the river.

Now that the British army had failed, Admiral Cochrane sent two bomb ships to shell Fort St. Philip, which dominated the Mississippi River, day after day, minus breaks for lunch and dinner, from January 9 to 18. When the navy gave up, Lambert realized that his position was pointless and started ferrying his troops, wounded, and stores to the fleet. Cochrane then persuaded Lambert that the fleet should attack Mobile. The fort that guarded the entrance to Mobile Bay surrendered on February 12 after a three day siege and it seemed likely that Mobile would fall soon after but news of the treaty arrived the next day.

Aside from a series of naval victories early in the war, the American record had done little to disprove the view that the victory in the Revolution had been a fluke. The withdrawal of a shattered British army, fresh from victories in the Peninsular War, showed that the United States was more than capable of defending its independence. At the same time, joy in a shared triumph helped unite the residents of the eighteen states as a nation and Jackson became a national icon.

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Related Movies:

The Buccaneer (1938)
Directed by Cecil B. DeMille, starring Frederic March and Franciska Gaal
Powerful pirate Jean Lafitte debates whether to join the greatly outnumbered American army and defend New Orleans or play it safe by working with the invading British during the War of 1812.

The Buccaneer (1958)
Directed by Anthony Quinn, starring Yul Brynner and Claire Bloom
Powerful pirate Jean Lafitte debates whether to join the greatly outnumbered American army and defend New Orleans or play it safe by working with the invading British during the War of 1812. (please click here to read the review)

Further Reading:

The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew Jackson and America’s First Military Victory-Robert V. Remini, New York: Penguin Books, 2001.

Remini has written numerous books on the Jacksonian era, therefore he has an excellent grasp of the material, which enables him to provide an extremely clear and concise explanation of the events leading up to the battle for New Orleans and Jackson’s surprising victory. The author actually retraced the British army’s route through the swamps to reach New Orleans in order to better understand the ordeal, which is probably why the book has very good maps. Unlike many writers who simply present the order of a battle and tally up the casualties on both sides, Remini shows how the participants were affected by the resulting carnage.

The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812-Robin Reilly, Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002.

This is an updated version of the original 1974 book. The author is one of the few British historians to look at the War of 1812, instead of the Napoleonic Wars. As a graduate of Sandhurst, the British officers school, he is well qualified to discuss the military aspect of the campaign. Half of the book explains the origins of the war and its progress until the New Orleans campaign in order to provide the reader with background. Unlike almost everyone else who writes on the War of 1812, he devotes a fair amount of space to the war against Napoleon, in particular the struggle for the Iberian Peninsula, instead of merely using a couple of sentences to mention that Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow freed up British troops for the Canadian front. His explanation of the rise of New Orleans shows reflects his genuine fascination with the city.


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