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In the summer of 1777, Major General John Burgoyne led an army of over seven thousand British and German troops from Canada through the Hudson River Valley with the goal of capturing Albany and splitting the American colonies in two. A significant portion of Burgoyne’s army was made up of German dragoons who had marched the whole way from Canada in jack boots and spurs. Frustrated by the army's slow pace, Burgoyne finally agreed to the proposal of Major General Friedrich Riedesel, the senior German officer, to send his horseless dragoons towards the Connecticut River to distract the Americans and procure horses. Burgoyne expected that they would also bring in cattle, wagons and recruits. Riedesel assigned the task to Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum and gave him 750 men (374 Germans, 150 Loyalists, 100 Indians, 56 Canadians and 50 British marksmen). Baum’s objective was the supply depot at Bennington, 35 miles away, where he was to collect horses and then continue east before crossing the Hudson and rejoining the main army, which would presumably also have crossed the river. Bennington had been selected as a target because Burgoyne’s Loyalist advisors believed that it was guarded by only four hundred militia.

Unfortunately, the Loyalists’ information was out of date, since fifteen hundred New Hampshire militia had already gathered at Bennington. The surprising capture of Fort Ticonderoga on July 5 had driven the assemblies of New England to work together to oppose the British advance. Brigadier General John Stark had brought his men to Bennington and contacted Colonel Seth Warner, commander of Vermont’s Green Mountain Boys, thirty miles away at Manchester, to arrange the defense of the area. However, the loyalists were unable to learn of this dangerous development, but a number of rebels pretended to be loyalists in order to join Baum’s column and discover the full size of his force. On the morning of August 14, Baum was more than ten miles away from Bennington and he learned that fifteen to eighteen hundred rebels had gathered there but the report that he sent to Burgoyne dismissed their potential threat. Stark was more concerned and sent messengers to tell Warner to bring in his force.

Baum reached Bennington later that afternoon but since Stark was already dug in and it was late in the day, Baum placed his men on the high ground four miles to the west of the village, thus disregarding his order to retreat if outnumbered. Instead of putting all of his troops on the high ground, Baum chose to defend a bridge on the Walloomsac River that was half a mile away from the hill and he connected the two positions with a series of three small detachments. Heavy rains the next day meant that no one did anything, since neither side could use their weapons.

When Burgoyne received the report, he did not share Baum’s confidence and asked Riedesel, to send reinforcements but he responded that Burgoyne would have to take responsibility for the expedition, so a day was wasted as messengers traveled to and from the two commanders’ camps. As a result, the relief force of 550 jagers (German light troops) and British troops, under Lieutenant Colonel Breymann did not leave until August 15. Baum had been joined by ninety Tories, so he had over 800 men.

A message from Breymann arrived on the evening of August 15, so he decided to remain where he was and wait. Baum felt that an inexperienced militia commander would be unable to organize a proper offense. Unfortunately, he did not face an ordinary militia commander. Stark was a veteran of the Seven Years’ War, and had been an officer in Major Robert Rogers’ Rangers. He had fought at Bunker Hill, Canada and Trenton but had resigned his Continental commission when an in inexperienced officer was promoted to brigadier general instead of him. He had only agreed to command the militia if he was responsible to the New Hampshire legislature and not the Continental army. He had even refused to join Major General Philip Schuyler on the Hudson in order to preserve his independence.

When the clouds cleared around noon on the 16th, instead of a frontal assault, Stark launched an attack from three directions against Baum in order to separate the main position from the spread out detachments. Baum’s disdain for his enemy meant that the indiviual groups were ignored even as they moved closer and closer to his position. They were only noticed after they started firing at three o’clock. Worse, Baum’s Tory advisor was convinced that additional loyalist parties would come in, and had spread word that they put pieces of white paper in their hats to identify themselves. The rebels heard of this and successfully used it as a tactic to get close to the enemy.

Stark’s skillful coordination of a thousand militia ensured that within a short period of time the scattered detachments were overwhelmed and Baum’s main force was on its own. Baum’s 170 dragoons and 20 British fought off the enemy for two hours until they ran out of ammunition. However, Baum received a fatal wound when they tried to hack their way through the enemy and only 29 dragoons were able to escape.

It turned out that Breymann had moved a lot slower than Baum had expected, partially because his men had to drag themselves and two cannon through the sea of mud formed by the heavy rain. Furthermore, Breymann did not feel that it was an urgent situation since Baum’s report had said that he was not in any real danger, so he moved at a leisurely pace. The same mud that had impeded Breymann also slowed down Warner’s force but they still covered the thirty miles from Manchester in a day. When night fell on the fifteenth, Breymann’s force was more than twenty miles away. By late afternoon the next day, they were still six miles away and they only arrived after Baum’s force had surrendered.

Stark’s men were exhausted from the fight and had spread out to loot the enemy, so Breymann’s troops easily pushed through the scattered militia. However, Seth Warner’s men had arrived around the same time and combined with Stark’s men and two captured light cannon, they were able to force Breymann to retreat. The cannon were abandoned but Breymann was able to take away his wounded and destroy a key bridge, which gave him enough of a head start to escape. Actually, it was fortunate for Stark because if he had pursued Breymann he would have run into a British regiment led by Burgoyne.

As it was, two hundred Germans had died and seven hundred were captured, along with four cannon and a great deal of ammunition and muskets. Burgoyne had lost fourteen percent of his army, and believing that the prospect for loot had greatly declined, the vast majority of his Indian allies departed, leaving him with only eighty Indians for scouting. Stark only lost thirty dead and forty wounded. The victory was a tribute to Stark’s skill in leading a wide range of militia units against professional soldiers and his ability to determine his enemy’s weak points, so he became known as the Hero of Bennington. Also, Baum had disobeyed orders and put himself forward to be slaughtered while Breymann’s decision to drag along cannon meant that he had moved far too slowly. Burgoyne would miss those men and the supplies that they were supposed to capture when he encountered the rebel army at Saratoga.

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Further Reading:

1777: The Year of the Hangman-John S. Pancake, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1977.

The book provides a concise explanation of the background to the Revolution, the royal government’s response and the early stages of the war as both the British generals and the young American army fumbled to find a strategy. It explains the difference between the British military and the newborn American army, and discusses the tradition of the militia, as well as the reasons behind the British emphasis on drill, including an invaluable step by step demonstration with pictures of the actual process of loading and firing a musket. The author destroys the myth that the Revolution was won by rugged Indian fighters, whose sharp shooting skills cut the silly, slow-moving British with their stiff formations to ribbons, pointing out that if it had been that easy, it would not have taken eight years to win the war. Most important, Pancake shows what Howe’s army was doing in Philadelphia while Burgoyne’s expedition crawled southwards and explains the reasons behind the fatal lack of cooperation between the two commanders that enabled the rebels to win a stunning victory at Saratoga. The book’s broad approach makes it a splendid addition to the library of any serious student of the Revolutionary War but it can still be enjoyed by the general reader.

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