After failing to destroy the rebel fort on Sullivan’s Island in 1776, the British basically ignored the Carolinas for the next four years, and focused all of their efforts on the North. As a result, the South escaped the destruction that had spread through the Northern colonies. By late 1779, the war in the North had reached stalemate, and British leaders believed that the South was overflowing with loyalists who would flock to a British army. Lured by the vision of a miraculous land of Loyalist recruits waiting to be plucked from the vine, ninety troopships with 8,500 soldiers under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton sailed from New York City on December 26, 1779, and although powerful storms scattered the fleet, the troops were able to land unopposed at Simmons Island, 30 miles south of Charleston, on February 11, 1780. Clinton had taken part in the disastrous assault on Sullivan’s Island four years ago, and he left nothing to chance during his march on Charleston. In fact, he was so hungry for men that he took the majority of British regulars assigned to defend Savannah, thus limiting Major General Prevost’s ability to control any part of Georgia other than the town itself, so that he was unable to protect the Loyalists outside of the town, further encouraging local Patriot partisans.

Although Clinton’s army only had to cover 30 miles, the Stono River had to be crossed, so he spent several days building fortifications at Stono Ferry to control the crossing. Major General Benjamin Lincoln, the commander of the Southern Department, initially had about 2,200 men, so he basically limited himself to observing the British march, although reinforcements later swelled his force to over 5,000. Despite the lack of opposition, Clinton did not know how many men Lincoln had, and since the British fleet under Admiral Marriott Arbuthnot had not blockaded Charleston, Clinton continued to advance slowly and carefully, so the British only reached the mainland on March 10.

Once the British had crossed the Stono River, the only natural obstacle between them and Charleston was the Ashley River, so the Americans fortified Ashley Ferry, but a force of Clinton’s elite troops managed to sneak past the ferry on the night of March 29, and land five miles upstream. Outflanked, the Americans abandoned the ferry, so the main British army was able to cross with ease, and had starting digging trenches in front of Charleston on April 1. The lack of major battles does not mean that the British march was unopposed, there were frequent skirmishes throughout the march, but they barely even delayed the British advance.

Lincoln was an able, if unimaginative, commander, who had lost much of his army in a failed attempt to invade Georgia and had only three months earlier been beaten when he tried to take Savannah, so the morale of his troops was not very high. The key to Charleston’s defense was its harbor, which was defended by a small American fleet and the 40 guns of Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island. Despite outnumbering the American fleet, Arbuthnot was worried about Charleston’s tricky sandbanks, which made it difficult to bring all of his fleet into battle at the same time. He need not have worried, the commander of the American fleet, Commodore Abraham Whipple, decided not to risk battle, and retreated to the inner harbor, while the guns of Fort Moultrie failed to prevent the British ships from sailing past to blockade the port and add their guns to the bombardment of the city. In fact, American gunnery was so ineffective that the British fleet suffered a total of 27 casualties. The digging of siege trenches closer and closer towards the city proved to take much longer and cost a handful of casualties every day, as they gradually tightened the noose around the city.

Clinton’s next move was to cut off Lincoln’s supply route by sending 1,400 men under Lt. Col. Webster to capture the area on the other side of the Cooper River (Charleston was at the end of a peninsula bordered by the Ashley and Cooper Rivers). Monck’s Crossroads controlled access to Biggins Bridge on the Santee River, which was a key part of Charleston’s connection with the rest of South Carolina, and was defended by General Isaac Huger and 500 troops. On April 13, Webster sent two irregular units, Tarleton’s British Legion and Major Ferguson’s Queen’s Rangers, to attack Huger’s men at night. Huger had neglected to post patrols, so Tarleton’s men were able to take the Americans completely by surprise. Most of the Americans were able to escape into the darkness, but the British captured all of their supplies, and more important, the American cavalry’s horses, which were badly needed since most of the horses had died on the voyage. This was Tarleton’s first use of the methods that he would employ throughout the Southern campaign, move fast, catch the enemy by surprise, and charge with the sword and bayonet. Tarleton kept a tight rein on his troops during the march, but became infamous on both sides for letting his troops rampage after the fight. In fact, Ferguson felt that Tarleton’s men had been so brutal that he wanted some of them to be shot and Tarleton became known as the Butcher.

This victory enabled Clinton to move his artillery close enough to shell the town and the bombardment was so heavy that Clinton told off his artillery commander for over-exuberance, pointing out that you don’t destroy a town you intend to occupy. When Lt. Colonel Francis brought 2,500 reinforcements on April 18, Clinton was able to send out troops to cut off all of the supply routes into Charleston.

On April 21, Lincoln agreed to surrender if the Americans could march out with their weapons, but Clinton knew it was only a matter of time, and rejected the offer. Cornwalis crossed the Cooper River on April 23, and sealed off the last of the escape routes. Actually, several of Lincoln’s officers had advised abandoning the city as early as April 13, but Lincoln believed he was duty-bound to mount a proper defense. As a result, the slow torture of the siege went on, and the British continued to lose men. Fort Moultrie surrendered on May 6, and two days later Clinton demanded unconditional surrender. Lincoln’s attempt to negotiate was brushed off, and he finally gave in the next day. The regular troops were made prisoner, while the militia were released on parole. American casualties were relatively light, 89 dead and 138 wounded, but the 2,571 Continentals captured meant that an American army no longer existed in the south. British casualties were 76 dead and 189 wounded.

Unlike the British government, Clinton did not believe that hordes of loyalists would appear in the South, but he did think that it would not be impossible to bring order to the Carolinas. Unfortunately, his proclamation offering amnesty to rebels who swore loyalty infuriated the Loyalists, who wanted the rebels to be punished. However, large numbers of rebels all over South Carolina surrendered, including even partisan leader Andrew Pickens. Clinton seemed to regret his initial leniency since on June 3 he issued a proclamation that cancelled the parole given to the militia, and ordered them to serve the British government if called upon. This ill-thought out pledge drove a good number of the parolees who would have remained neutral to join the partisans. Clinton then returned to New York and left the cleaning up to Cornwalis, telling him to concentrate on protecting Charleston and South Carolina.

Books:

This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782. John S. Pancake, The University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1985.

As the title states, the book concentrates on the campaign in the South but it also gives a brief yet insightful recapitulation of the American Revolution from 1775 to 1780, which explains that the French entry into the war in February 1778 meant that the Revolution had become part of a global war, therefore the British had fewer resources to devote to suppressing the rebellion. Unlike The Road to Guilford Courthouse, which limits itself solely to the campaign in North and South Carolina, Pancake also shows that the British failed to learn from their abortive attempt to conquer Georgia in early 1779, which was due to their inability to recruit sufficient militia to hold a large area without the support of British regulars. This lesson would be painfully re-learned in the Carolinas. Pancake also provides a quick explanation of the limitations of the main weapons used in the Revolution, examines what made the redcoat so formidable and looks at the evolution of the Continental Army into a trained, professional army that was capable of facing British regulars on equal terms. This background information is similar to that provided in 1777: Year of the Hangman, which he also wrote, and while it is useful, it occupies a quarter of the book, so there is less time to spare for the personality conflicts that made the war in the south so fascinating.

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