Howe’s fleet moved around the Atlantic coast before landing in Chesapeake Bay. He had ignored his staff and listened to the naval officers, deciding to sail to Philadelphia the long way, instead of by way of the Delaware River or across the Hudson River through New Jersey, where he could support Burgoyne’s advance along the Hudson. Unsure about Howe’s destination, Washington had kept his army near New York to counter any British moves up the Hudson. Once it was confirmed that the British had sailed for Chesapeake Bay, Washington had to move towards Philadelphia but he still worried that Howe would pull a fast one and move back to link up with Burgoyne. However, he took advantage of the situation and marched his 14,000 men through Philadelphia to show the people of the capital their army.

Aside from making it impossible to support Burgoyne, another disadvantage to sailing the long way became clear when the British finally landed after thirty-three rough days at sea. Most of the horses had died during the voyage, while the troops were exhausted after spending a month crammed below decks in the stifling summer heat. Despite the arrival of the British, only a handful of Loyalists appeared, partially because of widespread looting by British and German soldiers. Enough horses were captured that the cannon could be moved but the majority of the dragoons were forced to walk, thus depriving Howe of his screening force and the ability to exploit any weaknesses in the enemy.

Washington actually slightly outnumbered Howe and was well dug in on one side of the Brandywine River, so only a flanking attack would work. Early in the war, Washington had been outflanked at Long Island and the painful memory of the British army suddenly appearing behind his defensive lines and the ensuing slaughter was still fresh in his mind, so he carefully inspected the lines to ensure that every possible ford was covered. His inspection was apparently not thorough enough since Howe still managed to outflank Washington again at Brandywine Creek, a couple of miles away from the rebels’ lines, on September 10. Knyphausen was sent with half of the army to keep Washington busy while he and the other half under Cornwalis hit the rebels’ right flank. It would take quite some time for the flanking force to go all the way around so there was the risk that Washington would advance and destroy Knyphausen when he was alone and vulnerable but Howe had faith in him and little respect for Washington’s ability. By 10:30 in the morning, Knyphausen was facing the American lines on the other side of the river and then he settled down to wait for the weakening of the enemy lines that would tell him that Howe’s plan had worked.

Howe’s force crossed the Brandywine a couple of miles away from Washington’s right flank but enough patrols had seen the British troops advancing that the rebels had enough time to move troops to oppose the British. Howe remained unworried that his approach had been discovered and he was so confident that his redcoats could handle the rebels in a battle on open ground that the men were given an hour to rest. It had taken time for Washington to sift through the confusing reports and decide that Howe had indeed divided his forces. Unfortunately, he still believed it was just a strong feint so he only sent 3,000 men under Major-General Lord Stirling to block the attack. By 2:30 he had realized the danger of the situation, so he dispatched Major-General Sullivan’s division as reinforcements.

Sullivan had just taken command when the British attacked at 4:00, so he did not have enough time to rearrange men to fill the gap between his division and the next division. Most of his division broke under the assault but the other two divisions, most notably Stirling’s, held their ground. However, the rebels were outnumbered two to one, so the Americans were gradually pushed back until the Continental line no longer existed as a cohesive force but the rebel’s fierce resistance had worn out the redcoats.

Faced with catastrophe, Washington sent Major-General Nathanael Greene’s division with an extra brigade to plug the hole and they arrived just in time after covering four miles in 45 minutes. The battle shows that the Continentals were sufficiently battle-hardened by this time since when Greene’s troops encountered the chaotic remnant of Sullivan’s division they calmly let the men pass through and continued marching to fill the hole. After Greene’s division had been pulled from the main line to reinforce the flank, Knyphausen saw his chance and advanced across the creek. All that was left to oppose him was Maxwell’s riflemen, a division of inexperienced Pennsylvania militia and Anthony Wayne’s division. Wayne made the British pay for every foot of ground but the rebels were pushed steadily back for an hour and a half, at which point, Wayne’s men joined the retreat.

It was a rather disorderly retreat but Howe lacked the cavalry necessary to turn the retreat into a rout, so Washington’s army survived once again. That night the officers reorganized their chaotic units but many men had had their fill and simply melted off into the darkness. There were 1,000 American casualties and 400 captured against 557 British casualties, so it had been made clear once again that they were not the redcoats’ equal. Still, most of the men were optimistic, knowing that they had stood up to the best army in the world. 

By September 15, the rebels once again blocked the approach to Philadelphia and Howe planned another battle for the next day but was mystified when the rebel army disappeared after a massive torrential downpour. Unknown to Howe, the explanation was simple. American cartridge boxes were not as well made as British ones, and by the end of the downpour, none of the soldiers had any usable ammunition. Fighting the British in such conditions would have been suicide so Washington retreated.

To gain time, he ordered Wayne, Smallwood and Maxwell’s divisions to harass the British, although they proved to be less effective than he had hoped. On the night of September 20, Wayne’s 1,500 troops were caught unawares near Paoli by 2,000 men under Major-General Charles Grey, who had been sent by Howe after receiving information from local loyalists. To prevent the accidental discharge of a musket warning the Americans, the British troops were not issued flints, instead they were told to rely on the bayonet. Wayne’s troops were caught completely unawares, so they did not even have time to form up. Most of the rebels were able to disappear into the darkness but between 300 and 450 were bayoneted (accounts vary) against less than 20 British casualties, so the battle became known as the Paoli Massacre.

While this victory was welcome, it did not remove the main problem, namely the American army, which was dug in across the Schuylkill River, but Howe tricked Washington by having his engineers build a bridge as if he were planning another attack on Washington’s right flank to capture a valuable supply depot. Washington fell for the trick and abandoned the ford he had been guarding, so the British were able to cross during the night of September 22. In the end, Washington had chosen to defend his supply network rather than the capital, especially since he was outnumbered because Wayne, Maxwell and Smallwood had not rejoined him. Part of the problem was that Maxwell did not handle his light infantry nearly as well as Daniel Morgan, who Washington had grudgingly sent to help Horatio Gates deal with Burgyne. Having slipped past the rebels, the British entered Philadelphia on September 26 but it was not the great victory that Howe had hoped for. The rebellion did not implode once the capital was taken, Washington’s army was still in good shape, and the Delaware River, the primary supply route for the city, was blocked by American forts. 

Reinforcements of 900 Continentals and 600 militia brought Washington’s army to 8,000 Continentals and 3,000 militia by September 29, which meant that he outnumbered Howe, especially since Howe’s troops were scattered all over Philadelphia and the surrounding area. The main force was at Germantown but they were not dug in, so Washington decided to attack, moving during the night of October 3/4 in order to surprise the British at dawn. His plan was for four separate columns to attack the British positions from different directions, which would naturally require skillful coordination and/or excellent communication lines to ensure that the four columns stayed on schedule. The plan was modeled on the successful approach used at Trenton but unfortunately the British troops at Germantown were not drunk and they had posted sentries. Washington was with Sullivan’s and Wayne’s divisions, so they stayed mainly on schedule but Greene’s column with most of the best troops were delayed because his guide got lost in the dark. The other two columns were made up of militia, Armstrong’s Pennsylanians and Smallwood’s Marylanders respectively. Smallwood’s column never even reached the battle because it had the most roundabout route, while Armstrong also arrived late.

Washington had pulled in reinforcements from every possible place to get his army back up to 11,000, thus highlighting Howe’s problem. He had desperately wanted to fight Washington, he got the battle, and he won the battle, but the only change in the strategic situation was that his army was a little weaker while Washington’s army was ready to fight again shortly after. Howe was undoubtedly a better battlefield commander than Washington but he never developed a strategy that could win the war.

The attack failed because only one of the four columns, the column led by Washington, actually reached its assigned objective on schedule. Although the British were warned by loyalists, the assault was stronger than expected and the Americans were able to push the British and Germans back. Unfortunately, Washington wasted a brigade and valuable artillery that were needed elsewhere trying to capture a British-occupied house instead of simply going around it and keeping the momentum. The separate columns never really linked up and they soon found themselves exposed after advancing too far.  

The British were reforming but the situation had not yet become dangerous when, confused by the fog, Wayne and Stephen’s divisions fired on each other. Stephen, under the influence of strong drink despite the fact that it was early in the morning, ordered a retreat, thus creating a hole which Howe’s counterattack poured through. It was a bloody, three hour long battle with 537 British casualties and 652 American as well as 400 captured. A major reason for the defeat was an overly complex plan for inexperienced troops that involved coordinated attacks by four separate forces, as well as thick fog that made it impossible to see more than a few yards. However, unlike Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga, the American army avoided a complete defeat and most of the army escaped.

Washington did not blame others for the defeat since it had been his plan but Stephen’s drinking had clearly become a problem so he was dismissed and Lafayette received his division. Washington’s defeat meant that he abandoned his attempt to force the British out of Philadelphia, instead he switched tactics and used the forts along the Delaware River to starve the enemy out.

Books:

1777: The Year of the Hangman-John S. Pancake, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1977.

The book provides a concise explanation of the background to the Revolution, the royal government’s response and the early stages of the war as both the British generals and the young American army fumbled to find a strategy. It explains the difference between the British military and the newborn American army, and discusses the tradition of the militia, as well as the reasons behind the British emphasis on drill, including an invaluable step by step demonstration with pictures of the actual process of loading and firing a musket. The author destroys the myth that the Revolution was won by rugged Indian fighters, whose sharp shooting skills cut the silly, slow-moving British with their stiff formations to ribbons, pointing out that if it had been that easy, it would not have taken eight years to win the war. Most important, Pancake shows what Howe’s army was doing in Philadelphia while Burgoyne’s expedition crawled southwards and explains the reasons behind the fatal lack of cooperation between the two commanders that enabled the rebels to win a stunning victory at Saratoga. The book’s broad approach makes it a splendid addition to the library of any serious student of the Revolutionary War but it can still be enjoyed by the general reader.

The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778-Stephen R. Taaffe, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

Taaffe points out that although the Philadelphia Campaign was the only time when the British and American armies faced each other where neither side had an overwhelming numerical advantage, the Northern Campaign generally receives more attention because a British army surrendered at Saratoga, while the strategic situation remained essentially unchanged by the end of the Philadelphia Campaign, despite several hard-fought battles, namely Brandywine, Germantown and Monmouth Courthouse. Like almost everyone writing on this period, the author states that Howe made a strategic blunder in refusing to coordinate with Burgoyne, who was coming down from Canada along the Hudson River, which meant that Washington was free to send enough troops to first block Burgoyne and then force him to surrender at Saratoga. However, no mention is made of the personal factors that influenced his strategy, such as Howe’s unwillingness to help a rival win glory, his political influence in Parliament which prevented his official superior, Lord Germain, from simply ordering him to cooperate with Burgoyne instead of politely suggesting that he do so, and the constant criticism by his subordinates that he was more interested in drinking and his mistress than in planning a campaign, which is why Washington was given time in the winter and spring to rebuild his army. Nevertheless, it is a well-researched, informative book that explains every stage of the Philadelphia campaign, from Howe’s hesitant efforts before leaving New York to Clinton’s final, rather embarrassing departure from Philadelphia less than a year later.

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