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Britain had been at war since 1793, so the British public was fed up with the high taxes needed to pay for it, and the United States government agreed in January to start peace negotiations, although progress was slow at first and they did not really start until August. Although the limited number of troops in Canada had forced the British to fight a defensive war during the first two years, Napoleon’s abdication on March 31 freed Britain to devote more resources to the war. By this time, the British government was determined to teach its former colonies a lesson. In April, Admiral Sir John Warren was replaced as commander of the North American station by Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, who launched a number of raids on the American coast to burn privateers in their harbors, while tightening the blockade.

The conquest of Canada was no longer a priority, instead the goal was survival, so changes in the American military command were clearly needed. Major General Wade Hampton was put on sick list, and William Henry Harrison resigned when he realized that he would not receive a major command. Brigadier Generals Izard and Brown were promoted to major general and a number of aggressive colonels made the jump to brigadier general, including Colonel Winfield Scott. Major General James Wilkinson was dropped from the military although he survived a court martial.

Command of the American army in the Niagara region was given to Brown. Realizing the need for a professional army, he assigned Scott to train the troops. The commander of Fort George, at the northern end of the Niagara River, Major General Phineas Riall, was surprised when Fort Erie, at the southern end of the Niagara River, fell almost immediately on July 3. Even so, he gathered two thousand men and the two armies encountered each other at the Chippawa River, near Niagara Falls, two days later. Accustomed to fighting militia, Riall dismissed the threat of the enemy, probably because Scott’s failure to obtain proper uniforms for his regular troops meant that they were dressed like militia. Scott’s training paid off since his troops were not only able to stand up to British regulars but actually forced them to retreat after a brutal 25 minute long exchange of fire. Riall retired to Fort George while the Americans took Queenston.

The momentum was suddenly with the Americans but to Brown’s shock, Commodore Isaac Chauncey refused to link up with the army once it reached Lake Ontario, fearing that Commodore Sir James Yeo, his opposite number, would exploit his absence, which meant that Brown would not receive the artillery needed to lay siege to Fort George. Worse, he did not prevent Yeo from transporting reinforcements under Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond to the fort on July 22. Faced with such a situation, Brown abandoned Queenston and retreated to the Chippawa River. News that British troops threatened his supply base at Lewiston made Brown return to Queenston on July 25 but the way was blocked by Drummond’s advance force at Lundy’s Lane. The Americans quickly captured the British artillery but Drummond refused to give up and launched a series of counterattacks. The fighting was so fierce that both Scott and Brown were put out of action but the British failed to break through and retake the guns. Everyone was exhausted, so it should not come as a surprise that Brown’s order to hold the ground was misinterpreted by his third in command, Brigadier General Eleazer Ripley, who ended up retreating, leaving the captured British artillery behind. The battle had been especially bloody with the British suffering casualties of thirty percent and the Americans forty-five percent, so Drummond had little interest in pursuing the Americans back to Fort Erie.

If Drummond had followed the Americans closely, he might have forced his way into the fort but he delayed in order to reorganize his supply line. Since the British had held the fort until July 3, he probably thought that the weak fort would be unable to resist a determined assault. However, the Americans expanded the fort by building solid earthworks around it, so Drummond had an unpleasant surprise when the army reached the area in early August. Lacking the artillery to batter it into submission, he decided to launch a frontal attack on the night of August 15. The overly complex plan called for attacks from four separate directions but only one column managed to capture part of the wall and when the troops tried to turn a cannon around to fire into the fort they accidentally set off a nearby magazine. The explosion destroyed a large part of Drummond’s army and convinced him to call off the attack. British casualties were over 900, including 539 missing, most of whom were victims of the explosion, against American casualties of 84. Drummond returned to shelling the fort in the hope of wearing down the Americans’ defences but he finally abandoned the siege on September 17 and returned to Fort George.

Brown was replaced by Major General Izard on October 12 and the total force numbered 7,000 men but Izard had little interest in the siege of a well-defended fort. After failing to lure Drummond out of Fort George, Izard blew up Fort Erie on November 5 and retreated across the river, so the Americans were basically back where they had started.

American forces in the Lake Champlain area had been greatly weakened when Izard had been sent with 4,000 men to help Brown at Niagara, so roughly 3,400 men under Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb were left to face the ten thousand soldiers, largely made up of recently arrived Peninsular veterans, under General Sir George Prevost, governor-general of Canada and commander-in-chief of the British military in Canada. His objective was control of Lake Champlain to strengthen Britain’s hand at the negotiating table and the British reached Plattsburgh, where Macomb was dug in on the south side of the Saranac River, on September 6. Since the American fleet was sheltered at Plattsburgh Bay, Prevost summoned the British fleet on Lake Champlain, commanded by Captain George Downie. Prevost wanted the American fleet destroyed at the same time as he assaulted the enemy positions, and refused to give Downie the time he wanted to prepare his heaviest ship, the 37-gun frigate Confiance, which had only been completed several days before.

Since the American fleet was already anchored they were essentially floating batteries while the British ships were dependent on the wind as they tried to enter the bay, so the advantage rested with the Americans. Worse, the land operation was delayed because the British columns became lost. After two hours of heavy fighting the American fleet was the victor but the British assault had just commenced and the Americans were being driven back when the attack was cancelled. Prevost had been so shocked by the naval defeat that he led his army back to Canada to the great disgust of his senior officers. If he had captured the land position, the batteries could have been used to force the American ships to leave the bay. Prevost’s extremely cautious nature had been an asset in the early stages of the war, when troop numbers were too limited to bear heavy casualties but it was completely unsuitable for offensive operations with large armies of veterans that could handle casualties. He was ordered back to England for a court martial but died before it could be convened.

While the land invasion had been unsuccessful, the British blockade was continuing to squeeze American commerce and any part of the Eastern seaboard was at risk of British raids. In particular, Rear Admiral Sir George Cockburn was hated for the frequent raids on the Chesapeake Bay coastline and the Atlantic coast, where numerous ships were burned. At the same time, the British navy basically eliminated both American merchantmen and privateers from the sea.

British command of the sea permitted Admiral Cochrane to lead a fleet into the Chesapeake Bay on August 19 to land four thousand troops and marines for an attack on Washington. Brigadier General William Winder, the commander of the military district that included Washington, was a political appointee and the nephew of the governor of Maryland but family connections failed to convince the governor to raise a powerful force of militia when the British fleet appeared. The military district had only been created on July 2, 1814 in response to news that Napoleon had abdicated, which would enable Britain to transfer troops for an invasion of the United States, with Washington the obvious target. Admiral Cockburn accompanied Major General Robert Ross as the troops marched towards Washington despite the stifling heat. By the 22nd, it was clear that the British were on their way, so the town quickly emptied as the majority of residents fled to the countryside with as many possessions as they could carry. Winder made no effort to slow the march of the enemy and the British reached Washington the next day.

While the British regulars were impressive fighting men, the force lacked artillery and cavalry, so it would have had difficulty breaking through solid defences. However, ineffective organization meant that the majority of the militia units reached Bladensburg, on the other side of the Potomac, exhausted and starving, with little time to dig in. Even so, with proper leadership, the 6,300 militia should have been able to hold off the British, especially since only 1,200 British troops made it to Bladensburg in time to take part in the battle. Most of the British casualties were due to fire from artillery, so once the redcoats were too close for artillery fire, several militia units were too terrified to face them and fled, which opened holes in the American defensive lines. Despite the numerical superiority, Winder had not prepared reserves, so the militia units that did stand their ground were unable to last long against the disciplined fire of the regulars, who were able to outflank them. In the end, the men that fought the hardest were the four hundred sailors manning a battery of cannon, who were guarded by a hundred marines.

Although immediate fault for the defeat rests with Winder as the officer in charge, Secretary of War John Armstrong has also received a great deal of blame for refusing to take seriously the threat of a British invasion of the capital. Under the orders of Admiral Cockburn, the President’s House, the Treasury Building, State and War Department buildings were torched, and the British retreated the following evening, slipping away at night to avoid any pursuit, which never appeared.

While Washington was officially the capital of the United States, it was far from its greatest city. Nearby Baltimore was the third largest city and a commercial hub, as well as a major base for privateers, so it was a juicy target. The British fleet reached Baltimore on September 11 but nine thousand militiamen from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland had gathered and strong defensive lines had been prepared under the direction of Major General Samuel Smith, who refused to allow Winder to take charge. The eager but inexperienced militia were bolstered by seven hundred hardened sailors and marines under the command of Commodore John Rogers. The British approach on September 12 was initially easy since Smith had expected that the British would attack by sea but when it was clear that they were coming by land he sent militia to block their route. Ross was killed by a sniper as he was ordering troops to move up in support of the advance troops. Despite the loss, the British continued to press forward but the militia were better led and made the British pay for every foot. Even so, several militia units broke, which opened holes in the American lines and a British bayonet charge drove the main American force to retreat. However, most of the militia remained steady and they soon reformed, so the British were still outside Baltimore by nightfall.

Cochrane’s ships began bombing the well-designed Fort McHenry, which defended Baltimore Harbor, but when several ships were scuttled at the edge of the harbor to prevent British ships from entering the harbor, Cochrane chose to abandon the planed diversionary assault on the area behind the fort because he believed that the troops would be better used in an operation against New Orleans. Deprived of naval support, Ross’s successor, Colonel Arthur Brooke, knew that his heavily outnumbered army would be slaughtered if he attacked the American positions, so the army retreated during the night.

The failure of Prevost’s invasion at Plattsburgh and Cochrane at Baltimore encouraged the British government to adopt Cochrane’s plan to invade New Orleans.

Although Baltimore had been spared Washington’s fate, the mood in the American government was grim. Further attempts to invade Canada seemed doomed to failure and American commerce was in sad shape, while the government’s finances were not very healthy either. Given such a situation, the American delegation to peace negotiations in Ghent, Belgium was motivated to end the war, and it was questionable whether or not they would win their primary objective, namely an end to impressment. Fortunately, the Duke of Wellington, victor of the war against Napoleon, advised the British government that since Britain did not occupy any American territory it should simply accept an end to the war at the original borders and postpone any complicated but trivial boundary negotiations for a later commission. After a period of further negotiation about the exact phrasing peace was agreed on December 24, 1814. However, news of the peace treaty arrived too late to prevent a British assault on New Orleans.

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Further Reading:

The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814-Anthony S. Pitch, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

The author devotes a great deal of time to bringing the period to life, explaining how the national capitol was gradually brought into existence and showing how it was basically a small town by the time of the war. His fascination with national archives leads him to devote more pages to the efforts made to preserve the young republic’s records and archives by transporting them away from Washington than some readers might think necessary. Furthermore, less time is spent explaining the battle of Bladensburg than detailing all of the destruction to the senate, house of representatives, the white house and the library of congress.

1812: War with America-Jon Latimer, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

While it is written from the British perspective, the book is a fair and surprisingly in-depth presentation of the war with very good maps. Latimer rightly points out that the desire to conquer Canada was a primary motivation for the Americans and the failure of the invasion guaranteed Canada’s independence. He explains the nuts and bolts of the British military well, including how much food and alcohol the sailors and soldiers were guaranteed respectively. The effect of privateers and the blockade on both American and British trade, and the illegal but widespread trade between Canada and New England are examined, so it is a good choice for those more interested in the economic aspect of the war. His concluding chapter summarizes how the war affected Anglo-American relations for the next generation and how the war has been viewed by American and British historians over the years.

1812: The War That Forged a Nation-Walter R. Borneman, New York: Harper Collins, 2004.

Although it is told from the American point of view, it is a good single volume account of the war that is both readable and well-researched. He provides a perceptive background to the simmering tensions that were building up before war was declared. For those confused by terms such as the weather gauge, Borneman provides brief but effective explanations of the complexities of naval battles. My sole frustration is that the maps are fine for individual campaigns but there no decent maps of the overall strategy.

The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History-J. Mackay Hitsman (updated by Donald E. Graves), Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999.

The introduction by Graves shows that previous writing on the War of 1812 had entrenched the myth that the militia of Upper Canada with only token assistance from British regulars had repeatedly thrown back the American invaders and preserved the independence of Canada, ignoring political, diplomatic or economic aspects of the war. Therefore, the book was pretty much the first even-handed approach to the war that appeared in Canada. At the time, his respectful treatment of Prevost was considered controversial since he had previously been viewed as a dangerous incompetent. The original version did not include his references for all of the quotations and since he passed away from cancer shortly after it was published, four historians collaborated to produce references for the new edition. Hitsman provides a good explanation of the organization of the British military, the system for purchasing officer ranks and the type of people who were recruited into the army. As the title states, it is a military history and people might be put off the large amount of detail devoted to movements of troops and huge variety of units’ names, so it is best suited for the student of the era, rather than the general reader.

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