Following the surrender of Charleston, Cornwalis concentrated on cleaning out any surviving groups of rebels in South Carolina, and one of his main targets was Colonel Abraham Buford, who was retreating with Governor John Rutledge to North Carolina. Aware that Buford had a ten day lead, Cornwalis sent Tarleton with 270 men after Buford. Tarleton was never one to let exhausted horses get in the way of killing rebels, so he ruthlessly drove his troops forward, and commandeered new horses to replace any that died. As a result, Tarelton covered 105 miles in fifty four hours and caught up with Buford near Camden on the morning of May 30  but he had left many of his men. Buford had 350 Continentals, whom he formed into a single line. Although outnumbered, Tarleton divided his cavalry into three groups to attack all across the line, and they would have been cut down but the American officers had the troops hold their fire until the cavalry was only ten yards away, so they only had time to fire one volley before the cavalry smashed into the single line. Tarleton himself later admitted that if Buford had formed his troops behind the wagons and used his artillery, the battle would have gone quite differently. Even firing sooner would have blunted the cavalry charge. Instead, the Continentals lost 113 dead and 203 captured (many of the prisoners soon died of their wounds), while Tarleton’s casualties were 5 dead and 12 wounded. Troops from Tarleton’s American Legion massacred many of the surviving rebels, and while it is unknown whether Tarleton actively encouraged this or was unable to prevent the massacre, he quickly acquired a reputation as a savage. He was nicknamed Bloody Tarleton and Bloody Ban, and Americans would shout “Tarleton’s Quarter” and “Buford’s Quarter” on other battlefields. 

Cornwalis’s forces quickly gained control of the two key back country outposts, Camden and Post Ninety Six, that controlled the main transportation networks between the towns, which gave the British the illusion that they had gained control of South Carolina. There was a string of posts from Beaufort and Georgetown on the coast, and moving inland at Cheraw, Camden, Hanging Rock, and Ninety-Six. These outposts would prevent reinforcements or supplies from North Carolina from reaching any remaining rebels and connect the British with their forces in Georgia and their allies, the Cherokees, since Ninety-Six was only fifty miles from Augusta, Georgia. However, outside of the areas immediately around the outposts a vicious civil war flared up and burned through the summer. Loyalist support was not strengthened by the widespread looting of the British and Hessian regular troops.

Cornwalis sent emissaries to the Tory communities scattered over North Carolina to tell them to remain quiet and gather the harvest, instead of rising up, until he arrived with his army in September. However, filled with confidence now that the British had taken Charleston, 1,300 Tories had assembled at Ramsour’s Mill by June 20, 1780, and the local rebel militia had heard of this. Colonel Lock raised 400 men, and even though they were clearly outnumbered, rasher heads prevailed, so Lock agreed to attack the Tories, who were camped on the top of a small hill. Neither side was very disciplined, the men did what they pleased, but the rebels managed to turn the Tories’ flanks, and force them to retreat. The Tories regrouped on the other side of a nearby creek, but were unwilling to counterattack, so the survivors simply scattered. Needless to say, Cornwalies was furious that the Loyalist officers had allowed the Tories to rise up so early.

Despite the initial wave of despair that followed the British capture of Charleston, forces were stirring to oppose British control of the South. The rebels won a victory in South Carolina when one of Tarleton’s less prudent officers, Captain Huck, with 115 dragoons and Tory militiamen were caught unawares at dawn on July 12 by 250 rebels led by William Bratton and John McClure. No patrols or pickets had been set, so Huck and roughly 35 Tories were killed, and most of the survivors were captured. This victory over British dragoons encouraged even more people to join partisan bands, especially the band led by Brigadier General Thomas Sumter, nicknamed the Gamecock.

Sumter was not easy to get along with, he could have given lessons to actors on how to be a prima donna and his preference for repeated, bloody frontal attacks caused many experienced partisan leaders to avoid service with him in the interest of self-preservation, but he did not know how to give up, and that was a priceless asset after the fall of Charleston. He had played no role in the fighting for Charleston, but when Tarleton came looking for him in May 1780, he left his home, which Tarleton then burned. Sumter found other officers and men who had escaped Tarleton, and he was elected CO of the South Carolina militia on June 15, 1780.

Aside from Sumter’s band, small bands of militia guerrillas were forming all over the state. At the same time, an army of 1,400 well-trained, experienced Continentals reached North Carolina in June 1780, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jean, Baron de Kalb, one of the many foreign volunteers who had arrived in America seeking fortune and glory, and one of the few with any ability. While the title of baron was made up, he was rich and he had been sent by the French government to evaluate the rebels’ chance of success. He must have felt they were good because even though he had married a rich heiress, he left France and went to America as one of Lafayette’s volunteers. Unfortunately, the army was unable to go any further because it lacked supplies, to be specific the Patriot government of North Carolina was unwilling to issue supplies. The troops were from the Maryland and Delaware Regiments and they were among the elite of Washington’s small army, two of the regiments had taken part in every battle that Washington’s army had fought from Long Island to Monmouth Court House. In the right hands they would have been an excellent nucleus around which to build a new army in the South. Unfortunately, Congress decided to send Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, the Hero of Saratoga, to command the army. As a foreigner, de Kalb could not have commanded the Southern Department, and Congress preferred Gates over Washington’s choice, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene.

While de Kalb waited for Gates to arrive, and Sumter organized the partisans, Cornwalis was busy administering South Carolina and ensuring that his spread out outposts were supplied.Cornwalis was not happy as military governor, since he had to navigate the confusing mix of loyalties in South Carolina, while trying to run down the guerrillas who plagued his troops.

By the middle of the summer, Sumter had several hundred men, but his first battle, an attempt to take a British outpost at Rocky Mount failed miserably on July 30, 1780. However, he successfully led 800 men to defeat 500 Tory militia at Hanging Rock, admittedly more by luck than by skill. It would have been a much greater victory but Sumter and his officers were unable to stop the militia from looting and liberating rum, instead of pursuing the Tories. As it was, the Tories had 200 casualties, the rebels 50.

British and Tory infantry quickly found that pursuing rebel guerrillas was tiring and frustrating work, since the guerrillas could easily ride away if they were outnumbered. British infantry had to be combined with cavalry to force the guerrillas to fight, but Cornwalis only had about 240 regular cavalry, which was nowhere near enough. Furthermore, many of the partisan leaders had fought Indians and knew how to plan an ambush.

Gates arrived at de Kalb’s camp on July 25, and he immediately assured the hungry men that supplies were on the way even though the supplies never appeared. The senior officers advised him to go around Camden and use the pro-patriot Mecklenburg County in North Carolina as a base. Gates ignored their advice, and decided to march straight to Camden on the basis of Sumter’s report that the British were spread out in posts across the state so probably less than 1,000 men could be gathered at Camden. However, the surrounding area had already been stripped bare, so the hungry army became even hungrier. Actually, Gates had decided to go to Camden in order to link up with General Richard Caswell and 2,100 North Carolina militiamen, which took place on August 7. The North Carolina militia were led by officers more concerned with comfort than training their troops, which would prove problematic in the very near future. Gates’ army included Armand’s Legion of sixty cavalry and sixty infantry, as well as 70 South Carolina militia cavalry, which gave him 130 cavalry in total. Even though the region was perfect for cavalry, when Colonel William Washington brought his surviving cavalry into camp, Gates sent them away, saying he did not need them because cavalry were ill suited for the South, apparently forgetting about Tarleton’s Legion. However, he did accept 700 raw Virginia militia under General Edward Stevens. Gates was so unimpressed by Francis Marion's ragged little group of partisans that they were sent to the interior of South Carolina to watch the enemy, which saved him from the disaster at Camden and allowed him to build an independent command. Part of Gates’ steady stream of mistaken decisions was due to his willingness to accept Sumter’s intelligence reports at face value, which he could not confirm on his own because he lacked cavalry.

Gates may have been motivated by the desire to repeat his victory at Saratoga, but he forgot several things: 1) Continentals made up 70% of his army at Saratoga, but at Camden they were less than 30%, 2) he had access to steady supplies at Saratoga, but his troops at Camden were slightly above starvation levels, 3) Daniel Morgan’s riflemen controlled the information flow at Saratoga, but Gates had sent away his cavalry so he was almost completely in the dark at Camden, 4) Cornwalis was not Burgoyne, who pushed on and overextended himself, 5) Sumter was no Stark, and could not be relied upon to attack the British flank like Stark did at Bemmington.

Gates intended to build fortifications a few miles north of Camden and cut the British supply line, thus forcing the British to abandon Camden. Unfortunately, Gates’ lack of cavalry meant that he did not know that instead of 700 British Regulars, he faced Cornwalis and more than 2,000 troops. Cornwalis had leapt at the chance to escape the dreary administration of Charleston when he received the message that Gates was coming with 5,000 men. Although outnumbered, Cornwalis had Tarleton’s Legion, several other solid Tory regiments and the rest were crack British regulars, so 75% of the men were regulars or battle hardened Loyalists. British troops were not marksmen and the musket was a horribly inaccurate weapon, but British regulars were conditioned to march towards the enemy, and stand in line while firing volley after volley, shooting 2, 3, or even 4 times a minute. In such a situation, discipline and a willingness to take punishment decided victory. Furthermore, British troops were trained to fight with their bayonets, and this training took a long time, much more time than the training given to American militia.

Gates believed that he had close to 7,000 troops, but did not change his plan when he found that he actually only had 3,000. Worse, he decided to march his inexperienced troops at night, which guaranteed confusion, since it was a moonless night. Cornwalis had also decided to move at night with Tarleton’s Legion scouting ahead. Tarleton’s dragoons ran into Armand’s cavalry around 2 AM on August 16, and after a quick battle, both sides separated in order to wait for daylight. A British prisoner revealed that Cornwalis had about 3,000 troops, which sent Gates into a state of shock, and he immediately called a conference of his officers. Unfortunately, no one was willing to publicly advocate retreat, even though Washington himself had spent most of the war retreating and surviving, so when Brig. Gen. Stevens said they had no option other than to fight, Gates apparently found it easier to keep moving forward.

Gates had 900 trained, experienced Continentals under de Kalb on the right flank, 1,800 North Carolina militiamen in the center and on the left were 700 Virginia militia who were so raw that they had no idea how to use the bayonets they had been given. Having served with the British Army, Gates knew very well that the British army traditionally placed its senior, meaning most experienced, regiment on its right, which were opposite the inexperienced militia, and was basically asking for disaster. Otherwise the position was good since there were swamps on either side, so the British had to charge in the mile of solid ground between the two swamps. Lord Rawdon’s Tory regulars faced de Kalb’s Continentals, and the British left was made up of hardbitten veteran British regulars under Lt. Col. James Webster. Cornwalis kept 2 battalions of Highlanders and Tarleton’s Legion in reserve. The 800 British regulars charged the 2,500 Virginia and North Carolina militia and faced with a glittering line of bayonets, the militia collapsed, first the Virginians and then the North Carolinas. The panic spread like lightning and they broke through the 1st Maryland Continentals who had been put in the rear as the reserve. The Continentals under de Kalb were untouched by this panic, partially because they were busy beating back two charges by their Tory opponents. In fact, the Continentals had counterattacked and would have broken through if Cornwalis had not steadied the Tory troops. This gave enough time for Webster to stop his men from chasing the militia, and turn to attack the flank of the Continentals.

Actually, the North Carolina militia regiment closest to the Continentals stood firm, and held off Webster’s men long enough for the 1st Maryland to charge them, but the Maryland Continentals were unable to link up with de Kalb’s Continentals. An hour into the battle, Cornwalis sent Tarleton’s Legion to circle around and hit the Continentals from behind, who finally broke. De Kalb was found lying on the ground with eleven wounds. Tarleton’s men were then sent to cut up the retreating militia and capture the American baggage train. It is believed that American casualties were 250 dead and 800 wounded, all of whom were captured, while the British lost 68 dead and 256 wounded. When the Virginia militia broke Gates reacted by riding a fast horse as far away from the battle as possible and did not stop until three days later when he was 180 miles away at Hillsborough in North Carolina, where he began writing letters to Congress explaining why he had lost. De Kalb died around the same time that Gates reached Hillsborough.

Although two Patriot armies had been eliminated in South Carolina within four months, it became clear within the next two months that the British army only controlled wherever it camped. Everywhere else partisan bands roamed at will and loyalist units proved unable to handle them on their own.

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