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The Cherokee were a powerful tribe of 10,000 people living in roughly forty towns along the South Carolina-Georgia border. Although it took place during the Seven Years’ War, the Cherokee War that broke out in 1759 had its roots in frustration with South Carolina’s monopoly on trade. An additional factor was steady expansion into Cherokee territory that reached its peak in 1756 when Governor William Henry Lyttleton built Fort Loudon deep in Cherokee land on the bank of the Little Tennessee River, four hundred miles from Charleston.

Hoping to end their dependence on South Carolina for trade goods, the Cherokee eagerly worked with Virginia militia to protect the colony from the Ohio Indian tribes whose raiding parties were ravaging the frontier following the slaughter of Major General Edward Braddock’s army at Monongahela. However, they soon became frustrated by the poor quality of gifts that they received in exchange. Worse, while they were helping to defend Virginia, refugees from those raids were settling in Cherokee territory. The Cherokee had not joined the French because of the simple fact that the French could not supply them with trade goods, so gifts were very important to them. Hundreds of Cherokee joined Brigadier General John Forbes’s 1758 expedition against Fort Duquesne but they became fed up with Forbes’ condescension and eventually left.

The incident that sparked the war occurred when a group of Virginia militia killed several Cherokee returning home from fighting alongside Forbes. One of Virginia’s responses to the wave of Indian raids was to offer a bounty for Indian scalps. Since the colony’s government did not inspect the scalps too closely, the militiamen seized the opportunity to make some money by killing the Cherokee and claiming that the scalps were Shawnee. One Cherokee escaped to spread news of the massacre, which proved to be the final straw for the long-suffering tribe, and warriors started raiding settlements on the South Carolina border.

Tension began to build but little attempt was made to resolve Cherokee grievances because the war was popular in South Carolina, where it was viewed as an excellent opportunity to gain more land. Under the pretense of wanting to negotiate, Lyttleton captured a number of Cherokee chiefs and then marched with sixteen hundred men into Cherokee territory in October 1759. Fearing the consequences of war with the British, many of the Cherokee chiefs were willing to negotiate but Lyttleton’s demand that twenty-nine braves accused of murdering white settlers be handed over proved to be a deal-breaker. When the expedition was weakened by a smallpox epidemic and forced to retreat, twenty-nine Cherokee hostages were left at Fort Prince George, on the most western edge of South Carolina. All that had been accomplished was to strengthen the war faction of the Cherokee and show that South Carolina was unable to defend itself. Instead of ending the raids, the perceived weakness of the colony led the Cherokee to increase the intensity and frequency of their raids. Unwilling to accept the continued imprisonment of the hostages, a band of Cherokee attempted to force their way into Fort Prince George under cover of a parley on February 16, but they were driven off. Unfortunately, the fort’s commander had been killed and his troops executed all of the hostages in revenge, which provoked an even more savage wave of raids.

Lyttelton was replaced by William Bull in the spring of 1760 and the damage caused by the raids persuaded Major General Jeffrey Amherst to send eleven hundred regulars, including a battalion of Highlanders, under command of Colonel Archibald Montgomery. His second-in-command was Major James Grant, who had been captured at Duquesne and recently exchanged for a French officer. Montgomery’s men arrived at Charleston in early April and marched through Cherokee territory to relieve Fort Prince George, burning numerous towns along the way. However, when the expedition moved into more mountainous terrain in late June, Cherokee rifles and guerrilla tactics enabled them to wear down the British. On June 27, a heavy Cherokee attack was beaten off at a cost of 100 casualties, and when it became clear that his supply line was threatened, Montgomery retreated to Charleston, further lowering Cherokee estimation of British fighting ability.

Montgomery’s withdrawal meant that the garrison of two hundred men at Fort Loudon was on its own. Even more damaging, at least from Virginia’s viewpoint, the British retreat left the Virginia backcountry exposed. In fact, Virginia had been so confident that the British would force the Cherokee to negotiate that the colony had refused to raise militia to defend the region. With Montgomery gone, a force of Virginia militia was hastily formed to rescue Fort Loudon but the garrison surrendered on August 8 while the expedition was on its way. The garrison had expected that the Cherokee would allow them to march to Fort Prince George but twenty-six men, including the commander, were executed and the rest were taken away as prisoners. This was most likely not mindless savagery since the number of executed militia was almost exactly the same number as the Cherokee executed at Fort Prince George.

At this point, the Cherokee seemed to feel that they had taken sufficient revenge and agreed to return their prisoners after they received the desired terms from Virginia. Unfortunately, once again, South Carolina refused to play nice. To what degree they were motivated by a desire for revenge for the raids or were jealous of Virginia’s growing influence is unknown. Motive was matched by means when twelve hundred British regulars arrived in January 1761, under the command of Lt. Colonel James Grant.

South Carolina’s thirst for war put Virginia in a difficult position since the Cherokee had kept to the terms of the treaty but South Carolina had Amherst’s support. Pressed hard by Amherst, Virginia reluctantly recruited a force of militia but dragged its heels enough that the war was over by the time that the Virginia militia reached Cherokee territory.

Ordered by Amherst to chastise the Cherokee, Grant’s force of 2,800 regulars, South Carolina provincials and Mohawk Indians burned its way deep into Cherokee territory. His advance was opposed by a thousand Cherokee warriors on June 10 near where Montgomery had turned back the year before. The Cherokee had selected a narrow ravine for an ambush but a force of South Carolina rangers under Lieutenant Francis Marion managed to clear a path for the main force. The defeat of the ambush ended serious Cherokee resistance, and fifteen towns and fifteen hundred acres of farmland in the middle part of Cherokee territory were put to the torch. Without support from the French the war could only have one end but the Indians’ policy of wearing down Grant’s men had succeeded, so when he finally met with Cherokee headmen on August 28, his terms were much more lenient than when the expedition had started. The Cherokee had to give up a fair amount of territory but were able to preserve their independence, although they still had to recognize British authority.

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Further Reading:

Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years’ War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765-Matthew C. Ward, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.

The effect of the Seven Years’ War on Virginia and Pennsylvania has received little attention even though the two colonies bore the brunt of Indian raids and economic destruction, while gaining little of the wealth that accompanied the war since both states lacked ports. This was especially true since the area suffered Indian raids from 1755 to 1758 following Braddock’s defeat and then again during Pontiac’s Uprising in 1763. Ward provides a good examination of the spread of settlers into the two colonies during the fifty years before the war started, as well as a detailed examination of how the two colonies handled Indian raids during the seven years’ war and how they were affected by the actions of other colonies. It is a well-written and well-researched book that is probably of more interest to the specialist than general readers, but it is extremely valuable for devotees of this period, since the majority of books on the Seven Years’ War seem to be general studies, rather than deal with individual campaigns.

The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia-James Titus, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.

As the title suggests, it focuses entirely on how Virginia reacted to the challenge it faced during the Seven Years War. To be specific, Titus explores how the different elements of society interacted, showing how the richer part of society provoked trouble and the middle and lower classes only rallied to the military when their homes were threatened by Indian raids. He also explains that while the middle class property owners did not have the time or resources to form parties and challenge the rich planters for control of the local government, their unwillingness to serve unless in self-defence makes it clear that they were not as deferential as previous historians have believed. It also contains a very in-depth look at Virginia’s military structure with several detailed tables presenting the makeup and origin of men serving in the regiment. To be honest, despite the impressive amount of research, it is probably of interest to academics only.

Empires At War: The Seven Years’ War and the Struggle for North America 1754-1763-William M. Fowler Jr., Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2005.

The first chapter concisely explains the political situation in Europe and how conflict was brewing in North America despite the vast distances between the French and British colonies. The portraits of the main participants and contemporary paintings of the notable battles and forts are interesting but no replacement for actual maps. Admittedly, the footnotes give the modern locations of the places mentioned in the narrative but simply looking at modern maps does not give any sense of the scale of distance covered and just how empty the disputed areas were. Fowler also never details the specific number of casualties after each battle. As the title states, it focuses on the struggle for North America and spends little time explaining the situation in Europe. However, it is an excellent introduction to a conflict that set the stage for the American Revolution.

The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America-Walter R. Borneman, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006.

Borneman devotes more time to an aborted plan of union between the colonies than to the initial fight that started the war and Washington’s surrender at Fort Necessity. He excels at explaining the economic aspect of the war and makes Pitt’s global vision easily understood. Although specific numbers of casualties for each battle are provided, some of his explanations of battles are better than others, which I suspect reflects whether they are considered important or not. Pontiac’s rebellion is examined in good detail and shows how Pontiac’s leadership role has been overstated. The years immediately following the end of the war are covered to show how the frustration of not being able to settle the captured French lands combined with heavy taxes drove the colonists to revolt. Finally, he briefly plays the what-if game, while never forgetting that the game is both fascinating and pointless. Above all, he shows how the war transformed the kingdom of Great Britain into the British Empire. Oh, it has great maps.

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