Major General Nathanael Greene received command of what was left of the Southern Department after Horatio Gates’ disaster at Camden on October 14, 1780. One of the first things that Greene did was to send officers to survey key rivers in the area, in order to determine where the rivers could be forded to transport supplies. Given the lack of bridges in the Carolinas, control of fords was vital. Greene then proceeded to Charlotte, North Carolina to pick up what was left of the army from Gates, where he treated the Hero of Saratoga with respect, at least in public.

The Southern Department had only 1,482 men fit for duty when Greene took command, and he did not have enough supplies and equipment for all of them. When Greene first saw his troops, most of them had no shoes, were wearing a blanket, starving and had no self-respect. Actually, Greene had little patience for militia since they would not be controlled but they were still preferred by the states since Congress paid their costs. However, he did admire the partisan leaders. He met with Sumter who was recovering from his wounds and advised Greene to attack Cornwalis immediately, which given the state of the army, would have been a slaughter. Even Daniel Morgan, not one to back down from a fight, rejected the proposal.

Greene quickly familiarized himself with the maps of the countryside, and planned how to deal with Cornwalis, who had inflicted two disasters on the rebels in the south, and who outnumbered him two to one. Realizing that the land could not support his army, he ignored the military maxim of never dividing one’s forces and sent Morgan with his best troops west of the Catawba to operate along the North-South Carolina border, as well as placed both Sumter and General Davidson’s North Carolina militia under Morgan’s command, which Sumter unsurprisingly resented. Greene took the remainder of the army to central North Carlina to prevent the British from joining up with Tory Highlanders in the state. His strategy was to force Cornwalis to divide his army, while he built up his own army. He especially wanted to gather more cavalry because unlike Gates, he appreciated the value of cavalry in the South. Greene’s strategy proved successful, Cornwalis could not move into North Carolina to fight Greene when Morgan was threatening the key posts of 96 and Augusta.

Morgan had 300 Maryland and Delaware Continentals, 200 militia who were ex-Continentals and 80 Continental dragoons. The infantry was commanded by Lt. Col. John Howard, and the cavalry by William Washington. Morgan was soon joined by 360 South Carolina militia under partisan leader Andrew Pickens, who was less charismatic than Sumter, but more capable, and 120 North Carolina militia under General William Davidson. Fortunately for Morgan, Sumter was still recovering from his wounds, otherwise he probably would have quarreled over strategy.  

Morgan quickly demonstrated that the rebels had returned to the south. He sent Washington with 300 mounted men to deal with 250 Georgia Tories under Colonel Francis Waters, who were raiding nearby Patriot settlements. Washington found the Tories on December 29, 1780, and his dragoons cut through the Tories as if they were butter, killing and wounding 150 men without a single casualty.

While other partisans were willing to follow Morgan, Sumter refused to send either men or supplies. In fact, the Gamecock nursed a hatred for Greene that lasted even after Greene was dead and buried. At the same time, Greene had seen militia run from battle too many times so he did little to hide his contempt for militia. To his credit, Morgan avoided a direct confrontation, knowing how important Sumter was in the area, and passed the problem up to Greene.

Cornwalis continued to believe that if he could defeat this army then he would finally be free to move into North Carolina but he seemed to have forgotten that he had already captured Charleston and defeated two American armies, and yet the partisans had only grown stronger. Worse, the attempt to organize an army of loyalists to guard his left flank had ended in disaster when a powerful force of over 1,000 Tories were crushed at King's Mountain on October 7, 1780. Furthermore, first Major James Wemyss and then Tarleton himself had failed to eliminate Marion as a threat. Instead, Marion was wreaking havoc behind him and in December, Light Horse Harry Lee and his Legion of 300 men, half cavalry and half infantry, were sent by Greene in December to join Marion and make life difficult for the British.

In January 1781, Cornwalis sent Tarleton to keep Morgan away from his army, and defeat him if possible. Tarleton had 250 infantry and 200 cavalry of the British Legion, 250 men of Major Archibald MacArthur’s 1st Battalion of Fraser’s Highlanders, and 50 artillerymen with two light cannon. He was soon reinforced by the 17th Light Dragoons and the Royal Fusiliers.

Tarleton was trying to push Morgan towards King’s Mountain, where he believed that Cornwalis was waiting, but communications between the two quickly broke down because of horrible weather that made it hazardous to cross rivers, even though they were only fifty miles apart. Unknown to Tarleton, Cornwalis had actually stopped to wait for reinforcements. At the same time, Morgan was aware of Tarleton’s approach, so he moved his camp in order to avoid being trapped between Tarleton and Cornwalis, since he only had 940 men against Tarleton’s 1,100 to 1,200. Tarleton had been chasing Morgan since January 6, and had narrowed the gap considerably by the evening of January 16, at which point Morgan’s men were six miles from the nearest crossing of the next river, which would be difficult to ford because of heavy rains. Washington’s scouts found Tarleton less than ten miles behind, so knowing that he would not be able to get all of his troops across the river before dark, he decided to camp at Cowpens, a well-known Southern landmark, and wait for Pickens with more militia before fighting Tarleton. However, Sumter was still feeling cranky and did not send any men.

Morgan knew he would have to fight Tarelton, and after talking with his officers he knew that Tarleton’s record was based on savage, headlong charges against inexperienced troops. He also knew that he could not rely on the militia. He was familiar with the men of the militia because he had grown up around men like them, so he decided to use their reputation of fleeing as soon the shooting started. Cowpens was a meadow 500 yards long by 500 yards wide where cattle grazed, hence the name Cowpens. The meadow appeared to be flat but there were actually two small rises, much too small to be called hills, and Morgan placed his 280 Virginia and Delaware Continentals and 200 Virginia militia with Washington’s 80 dragoons in reserve, partially hidden by the rise. He then put 300 militia under Pickens 150 yards in front of the Continentals, another 100 militia on their right and a final 120 sharpshooters as a skirmishing line. Morgan did not expect the militia to stand against the British, instead he simply wanted them to fire two volleys at fifty yards and soften them up by taking out officers and sergeants before the British hit the Continentals. As soon as the second volley finished, the militia were to move and form on the left of the Continentals. Morgan had between 800 and 1,000 men, but he made sure that he spent the night going from campfire to campfire to personally explain what he wanted and why it would work.

The British arrived tired from marching on January 17 around 7AM, while the Americans were rested and had eaten breakfast. Tarelton felt that the terrain was suited perfectly for his cavalry, so he rushed his preparations for the attack, and did not consult his two main infantry commanders. He had 1,076 men, but rebel sharpshooters quickly made him call off the first cavalry charge, so he had his infantry form into line and attack. He sent off the 110 light infantry of 16th Foot, 250 British Legion Infantry and 167 Royal Fusiliers, keeping the 249 men of 1st battalion of Fraser’s Highlanders and 200 cavalry as reserve. The two small cannon (grasshoppers) were firing steadily at the centre of the rebel line as the British advanced, but Pickens kept the militia steady. The difference in marksmanship soon became apparent. The British volley had little effect while the rebels were taking a heavy toll of officers and sergeants. When Tarelton sent 50 dragoons to attack the retreating militia, Morgan was ready and Washington’s dragoons quickly pushed the British cavalry back.

At 7:15 the British paused to dress their lines, and then advanced to trade volleys with the Continentals. By 7:30 Tarelton had seen that the Continentals were not immediately crumbling so he sent the Highlanders to move around the right of the American line and outflank them. At the same time, Morgan and his officers were largely successful in their efforts to prevent the militia from running away. A mistake in orders had the men on the right of the American line turning around and marching to the rear, which was mistaken by the Highlanders as a rout, and British troops were used to American troops panicking so they charged only to have the Continentals quickly turn and fire at almost point blank range. The Continentals then charged and for the first time, British regulars were forced to retreat by American troops using bayonets. Despite many men shouting “Tarleton’s Quarter” Morgan and his officers refused to have any British massacred. The remaining British infantry, the Highlanders, were soon surrounded but they continued to fight. However, the 200 cavalry in reserve actually refused Tarleton’s order to charge and relieve the infantry. A final charge by about 54 dragoons under Tarleton was instantly met by Washington, and Tarleton was forced to retreat. By 8AM the only British left on the field were dead or had surrendered.

Cowpens was a major defeat for the British, and most of Cornwalis’ light force was lost there. 110 were killed, and 712 captured, only 14% of the troops made it out of Cowpens. The only infantry who escaped were the men guarding the baggage train. American casualties were less than 75.

Tarleton’s unbeatable reputation disappeared and he was shown to be a brave cavalry leader, but not an effective leader of large units. The rebels lacked artillery so why did he attack right away instead of having the cannon fire for a longer period to soften up the rebels? Morgan was criticized for not choosing an area with natural barriers, such as a swamp to protect his flanks, but he knew that a swamp would have been irresistible to the militia, and faced with Tarleton, there was little chance of anything other than a direct attack. Furthermore, he deliberately wanted a river behind him to make it harder for his men to run away, this way the men knew they had to fight. Don’t forget that Morgan’s only other choice was to have Tarelton hit him when he was crossing the river or on the march, both of which would be a disaster.

This victory had two major effects, Cornwalis lost his light troops, and Patriot morale soared, especially in the South. For the first time the roles were reversed. Washington drove his dragoons hard as he chased Tarelton, who only managed to escape because Washington was given wrong directions by a woman who feared for the life of her husband who was being forced to be a guide for Tarleton.

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