Morgan knew that he did not have time to celebrate his victory at Cowpens because Cornwalis was nearby, and would be coming after him as soon as he heard the news. Therefore, he started retreating at noon, knowing that he needed a good head start if he did not want to lose his prisoners as had happened during the chaotic retreat from King’s Mountain. He also sent a report to Greene but the roads were in such bad shape that it took six days for a courier to cross the hundred miles to reach Greene’s camp. Greene called in Lee and Marion, and gave orders for his army to link up with Morgan at the Salisbury River while he went with an escort of five men to meet Morgan, arriving at Morgan’s camp on January 30, 1781. Needless to say, Cornwalis was filled with fury when he heard Tarleton’s report and many older officers blamed the defeat on Tarleton’s youth and inexperience. Tarleton’s defeat meant that Cornwalis’ army shrank from 3,200 to 2,550 men in one day, so he no longer outnumbered Greene but he did have twice as many regulars. Fortunately, his reinforcements arrived the same day as news of Tarleton’s defeat, increasing his army by over 1,000 men.

Cornwalis wanted to catch Morgan so badly that he left his camp followers behind, but he still lost two days trying to find Morgan’s trail because he did not have enough light troops. When he learned that Morgan had already crossed the Catawba River and was two days ahead of him, Cornwalis had his baggage train burned, including the officers’ fine china, since he knew that otherwise his troops would never catch Morgan.

Greene had his own problems. The men of the Virginia militia had reached the end of their enlistment and despite the passionate appeal of their commander, Brigadier General Edward Stevens, only a few agreed to stay with the army, the rest went home. Greene and Morgan were angry that they were unable to recruit enough militia, but most men were busy hiding all of their worldly possessions from the approaching army, understandably since even Cornwalis admitted that he was unable to prevent his men from plundering.

Greene decided that General William Davidson and his 800 North Carolina militia would try to delay the British crossing of the Catawba so that Morgan’s men would have time to meet up with the rest of the army at the Salisbury. Cornwalis snuck his men across the river at one ford during a misty dawn and quickly pushed through the militia guarding the ford but this cost almost 100 men. As news spread that the British had made it across the Catawba, refugee columns filled the road, but Cornwalis wanted Greene’s army, not refugees, so he had them driven off the road.

Both armies were moving slowly because the rain had turned the roads to mud, so the troops slogged their way forward through knee deep mud. However, Greene’s men managed to stay a day ahead of the British and they linked up with the other half of the army under General Isaac Huger at Guilford Courthouse on February 7, and they were joined by Light Horse Harry Lee and his 280 men. By this time Morgan was too ill to continue. Greene wanted to fight Cornwalis but he had failed to recruit enough militia, and many of his men were in bad shape or badly armed. Worse, they were slightly outnumbered by the British, almost all of whom were regulars, so all of his senior commanders, including Morgan, recommended continuing to retreat.

Cornwalis thought that he had caught the rebels because he believed that Greene did not have enough boats to cross the ford closest to him but would have to march north to use the ford near Cornwalis. However, Greene’s advance planning paid off so he had enough boats, success depended on how long his light troops could prevent Cornwalis from discovering his destination. It was hard work for Williams’ light infantry and Lee’s cavalry but they successfully screened the Patriot army from British patrols, although Cornwalis eventually figured it out, so the race was on. In the end, the Americans moved faster, and won the race, the British covered forty miles in 31 hours, but the rebels did it in 20 hours.

This was a crucial victory, not just another river. Greene’s army was now in Virginia where they could obtain supplies and reinforcements, while Cornwalis had burned his baggage train and was 240 miles from his nearest supply base at Camden. Cornwalis made his base at Hillsborough, where the total absence of Tory recruits made him determine once and for all that the army of Tories in North Carolina was simply a myth. The British army was starving in North Carolina while the rebels were being fed properly in Virginia.

However, Greene knew that he had to go back and fight Cornwalis. Unfortunately, he had lost most of his North Carolina militia and had not replaced them with enough Virginia militia. The army began moving south when Greene sent Lee to link up with Pickens, who was still in North Carolina. At the same time, Cornwalis sent Tarleton with 450 men to escort Tory militia that were coming to join the British. Lee’s cavalry were dressed like Tarleton’s dragoons and they found the 400 Tories first, who believed that they had run into Tarleton as planned. Lee later said that he intended to let the Tories know and give them the option of surrendering but fighting started before he could reach the commander, Colonel John Pyle. With the cavalry only a few feet from the Tory infantry, it was a massacre, and 90 Tories were killed, some apparently after they surrendered. The battle soon became known as Pyle’s Massacre and ended any hope of recruiting a Tory army in North Carolina. Unlike Buford’s Massacre which filled Patriots with fury, Pyle’s Massacre filled Tories with fear.  

Cornwalis left Hillsboro when Greene’s army crossed the Dan on February 22 and re-entered North Carolina. Greene continued to have problems with the militia, since they came and left whenever they pleased, which drove him crazy. However, Cornwalis’ men were starting to starve and desert, so on March 6 he pushed the light troops under Otho Holland Williams hard in order to force Greene to fight but Williams got his men across a river ford just the British caught up. It was such a close race that the men who crossed first had to cover the crossing of the other men. That encounter with the British was the last straw for the South Carolina and Georgia militia, and they decided to march home, since they had been gone for two months, and their homes were quite far away. Pickens was sent to make sure they made it back safely, thus depriving Greene of one of the most effective partisan leaders. Fortunately, Greene received almost 2,000 reinforcements, 1,000 North Carolina militia, 400 Virginia militia and 400 raw Maryland Continentals, on March 10 and 11, so he began marching for Guilford Courthouse on March 12.

Guilford Courthouse was Greene’s preferred battlefield to face Cornwalis. Getting Cornwalis to fight was no problem, he was running out of food, and he was down to 2,000 men because of death, illness and desertion. The battlefield was much larger and more spread out than Cowpens since it was about 1.5 miles long and 1-1.5 miles wide. It was a slightly rising field with a road that curved slightly because of the slope, and the field had little hills and enough underbrush that the British would not be able to maintain their lines that struck such terror in the hearts of the militia, while the underbrush would provide cover for the militia.

The battle took place on February 15. Greene had 4,400 troops, but only 1,762 were Continentals. Greene followed the same strategy that Morgan had used at Cowpens, placing his troops in three lines. His 1,000 North Carolina militia were his least reliable troops, so he put them in the first line, behind a split-rail fence at the edge of the woods, and he also put riflemen on each flank, supported by cavalry and infantry. Like Morgan, but without Morgan’s charisma, he went down to the North Carolina militia to explain what was at stake and how they could win if they could just fire two volleys. Next were 1,200 Virginia militia 300 yards behind the first line, hidden by the woods. Their commander, Brig. Gen. Stevens, was so ashamed that they had run at Camden that he put 40 riflemen behind them with orders to shoot anyone who ran. The third line was 1,400 Continentals 550 yards behind the second line, in front of the courthouse.  

Cornwalis arrived about 1:30 PM. He did not care how many Patriots there were or what the terrain was like, he only knew that he was finally going to fight Greene. The British were hungry, they had just marched 12 miles, and they were outnumbered but they were ready to fight. The militia took a heavy toll of the advancing redcoats but they broke after exchanging a point blank volley at forty yards. They had given their two required volleys but without a leader like Pickens or Morgan to steady them their retreat was not orderly, they just threw away their weapons and ran to the rear. Fortunately, Stevens, the Virginia commander, had warned his troops to expect a mob of screaming men to come running towards them, and simply let them run through, which they did. The British on each flank then pushed the Patriot riflemen and supporting infantry back. The woods succeeded in breaking up the British lines and made it difficult to use the bayonet, but the British regulars proved to be more adaptable than thought and quickly cleared the woods of the Virginia militia, although they took heavy casualties. The British troops that emerged from the woods to see the Continentals waiting at the end of a clearing were tired after fighting through two lines. The commander of the first battalion, Lt. Col. James Webster, made the mistake of not waiting for the rest of the army, but charged at the veteran Maryland and Delaware Continentals who waited calmly and then ripped the Redcoats apart with a precise volley at 100 yards. While the wounded Webster was regrouping his troops, another British battalion, the 2nd Guards, emerged and charged a raw regiment of Continentals, who immediately broke and ran. The Maryland Continentals turned to block the Guards and were exchanging fire with them when Washington’s dragoons smashed through the Guards, breaking their ordered lines, so that the Maryland Continentals could charge with bayonets, and the British regulars and Continentals quickly became a chaotic mass of men struggling to kill each other.

When Cornwalis made it to the clearing he saw that the British army was on the verge of defeat, so he made an instant and ruthless decision, ordering the cannon to fire grapeshot into the mass of struggling men, which forced the two lines apart, betting rightly that the redcoats’ discipline would enable them to reform faster. Shortly after, more British battalions arrived at the clearing, giving Cornwalis hope that he could finally destroy the rebels. However, Greene knew that he had already hurt Cornwalis badly, so he used his reserve to cover the orderly withdrawal of the army, although he lost his artillery. Greene lost 79 dead and 184 wounded. The rebels retreated so in theory it was a British victory, but they lost 93 dead and 413 wounded (50 more died that night). Following Tarleton’s defeat at Cowpens, Cornwalis now had 1,400 soldiers, who were in no shape to pursue the rebels. Some might criticize Greene for not continuing the fight and finishing off Cornwalis, but Greene understandably had no desire to lose a third army in the south. Greene also lost an additional 885 militia who left immediately after the battle was over, which reduced his numerical advantage over Cornwalis.

The British army stayed at Guilford’s Courthouse because they had nowhere else to go, and most of the men lay on the ground in the pouring rain that night and the next day because there were too few houses. They may have taken the field but they had lost their spirit. They had also learned to respect the American troops. The British certainly did not look like a victorious army, so they failed to win many Tory recruits or obtain badly needed supplies. There were supplies at Camden but Camden was 150 miles away and more importantly, several overflowing rivers would have to be crossed. In addition, the British would have to fight their way through partisan bands with Greene’s troops shadowing them looking for an opportunity. Cornwalis’ other option was to go to Wilmington, which was 200 miles away on the coast, where he could re-establish contact with the navy. This would mean abandoning the both Lord Rawdon and the Tories in Carolina. He chose Wilmington because it was easier and hopefully Greene would follow him into Virginia. The army left Guilford Courthhouse on March 18 and the soldiers were so hungry that it was impossible to control their looting, so every farm near their path was abandoned. The survivors finally reached Wilmington on April 7.

Greene knew that if he could only get reinforcements then he had a precious opportunity to eliminate another British army. However, he lost his Virginia militia because their enlistment time was up and Virginia’s governor refused to provide Greene with more militia because he feared a British attack on Virginia by Benedict Arnold.

Share this page with others: