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The US position at Pusan had already solidified by the time of the Inchon landing, but MacArthur had been fixated by the idea of a landing at Inchon almost since the beginning of the war. However, his plan was originally opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, top-ranking naval officers, and the majority of the senior Army and Marine officers. Before they are criticized as lacking vision, remember that these were the men who had planned the landings during the Pacific Campaign, and their professional opinion was overwhelmingly against the idea. Unfortunately, other possible targets for an amphibious landing were too north, too close to Pusan or too small for an effective breakout. There was little debate about the strategic importance of Inchon, but it had a 32 foot tidal range, and only September 15, 17, and October 11 offered acceptable conditions for a landing. Even then, there was only a three hour window of opportunity, and tactical surprise was impossible since the offshore island of Wolmi-Do had to be taken before the landing could proceed. In addition, cargo-handling facilities at Inchon were limited, typhoon season was approaching and the beachhead would be vulnerable to fire from the surrounding steep hills. Memories of the Anzio disaster, where an American amphibious landing was pinned down on a beach for several days, were still fresh in everyone’s minds. Most important, why send two divisions to the other side of Korea when they would ensure a successful breakout at Pusan? The man on the spot at Pusan, General Walker, was none too happy that a brigade of Marines would be pulled out of the line for the operation.

MacArthur was aware of the dangers, but he feared stalemate at Pusan, and lusted after strategic freedom. Drama queen that he was, he gave a theatrical performance during a meeting in Tokyo with senior US officers sent by the JCS on August 23 where, with a tear in his eye, he said “I never thought the day would come, that the Navy would be unable to support the Army in its operations.” This persuaded them to seriously consider the plan, and he finally won the Joint Chiefs’ approval on August 28. In the end, MacArthur got his way because the entire US senior command overestimated the strength of the North Korean army, and thought that a breakout attempt at Pusan would fail. The NKPA’s non-stop attacks had led everyone to believe it was still strong, when actually the attacks bordered on suicidal, as the NKPA burned through its reserves. Furthermore, the generals and admirals sent to Tokyo to examine the merits of MacArthur’s plan were incapable of objectivity because they were dealing with someone who had already become an icon before the war, when they were still junior officers.

At the same time, the Marine Corps knew that the landing had to succeed, not just to save South Korea, but to save the Corps. Senior Navy and Army officers felt that the day of amphibian landings was over, and General Omar Bradley, the head of the Joint Chiefs, had stated that there was no need for amphibious landings in the nuclear age, therefore the JCS had cut the Marines to 74, 279 men across the globe by 1950, a shadow of their strength. Faced with the threat of being reduced to providing token units for ships, the Marines were burning with a desire to prove their value.

X Corps consisted of 1 st Marine Division and 7 th Infantry Division, which was understrength, so it was given all of the infantry replacements that arrived in August. By this time, so many troops had been sent to Korea that Japan had been left almost completely defenseless, but this was still not enough so 8,637 Korean soldiers were also drafted, most of whom spoke no English. Since they had literally been dragged of the streets three weeks before by ROK police, they were essentially useless, using up supplies but capable only of menial tasks. A fleet of 260 ships, many of them rusty relics from WWII, transported 70,000 men from Tokyo to Inchon, passing through Typhoon Kezia along the way. Unknown to the planners, the NKPA had thrown the vast majority of its forces against Pusan, so there were only 500 troops on Wolmi-do, and 1,500 raw recruits around Inchon. Furthermore, the British launched diversionary attacks at Chinnampo and Kunsan. The actual landing was under the command of Rear Admiral James Doyle, who had served under Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner during the island hopping campaign, while experienced Marine commanders would be in charge of the storming of the beaches, which reduced the JCS’ worries. The operation was not a well-kept secret in Japan but given the obvious difficulties of the Inchon landing, Soviet and Chinese agents most likely believed that it was simply a cover for a landing somewhere else on the Peninsula. To prevent interference from the Pentagon, technically his superiors, MacArthur delayed sending a complete plan of the operation and stalled until September 10, after the invasion armada had started to leave Japan, at which point he sent an officer to Washington to explain the plan in person, with instructions to take his time.

MacArthur mistrusted the pessimism that was rampant in Walker’s HQ and he had no rapport with the rough-edged Walker, who was not part of his inner clique, so he appointed his Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Edward Almond, to command X Corps, the force assigned to carry out the landing. Aside from the obvious slap in the face for Walker, MacArthur was later criticized for dividing command and for giving the command to a general with limited battlefield experience, who clearly needed a combat command to win his third star. Wolmi-do proved to be a walkover, and despite the advance warning of a five day long bombardment of Wolmi-do, the NKPA made no effort to reinforce Inchon. A massive bombardment ensured that most of Inchon’s defenders were too dazed to remember their names, never mind resist the Marines, so Inchon fell easily on September 15, despite a landing marked by massive confusion, and the US received only 200 casualties.

The drive towards Seoul commenced the next morning, which was defended by 20,000 troops, but the 1 st Marine Regiment pushed through relatively heavy resistance to reach the suburbs of Seoul on the 19 th. Once the troops were safely landed, control of the mission transferred to Almond, who was infamous for his abrasive nature, although full control had to wait until MacArthur left. Almond had played no role in the landing operation but this did not prevent MacArthur from awarding him a silver star for “conspicuous gallantry…he visited the front line units, and by personal example and fearless leadership encouraged them to seize assigned objectives with the minimum of delay.” He had actually visited the troops the day after the landing when everything was safe but MacArthur had his own view of reality.

Relations between the Marines and the Army quickly deteriorated, as Almond was fixated on keeping his promise to MacArthur that Seoul would be liberated by September 25, which was the three month anniversary of the initial invasion, while the senior Army officers felt that the Marines didn’t know how to fight properly once they were away from a beach. Almond continued to push the troops to move further and faster, which often meant that they were mistaken for the enemy by the air force. The fight to take Seoul was extremely heavy as NKPA troops had to be cleared out street by street, which resulted in the almost complete destruction of the city. The damage would have been much less if the city had simply been surrounded, but MacArthur’s timetable could not be altered and civilian casualties were considered unimportant. MacArthur’s HQ in Tokyo announced the capture of Seoul on schedule on September 25 although the Marines did not actually control the city until two days later. The quick victory also meant heavy casualties, one Marine company took 176 casualties out of a total of 206 men. Total casualties for the Inchon landing, including the retaking of Seoul, were 536 dead, 2,550 wounded and 65 missing.

Walker began his own breakout on September 16, and although the advance was slow at first because cloudy weather prevented air support, and MacArthur had taken away his strongest unit, the 5 th Marines, when the clouds broke on September 19, so did the North Korean line. North Korean units simply dissolved, either surrendering en masse or throwing away equipment and uniforms as they ran.

Ignoring instructions from the JCS to stay out of domestic Korean affairs, MacArthur insisted on officiating at the ceremony where Rhee’s government was restored at Seoul on September 29, while Rhee’s execution squads roamed the city killing any suspected collaborators or former political rivals. Despite the continuing battle for Seoul, men and equipment were diverted to build a pontoon bridge to allow MacArthur and Rhee to drive to the flag raising ceremony. He then flew back to Tokyo, leaving the cleaning up to Almond.

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Related Movies:

Retreat, Hell! (1952)
Directed by Joseph H. Lewis, starring Frank Lovejoy and Richard Carlson
Follows the 1st Marine Division during the Inchon Landing and street fighting in Seoul.

Further Reading:

The Korean War-Max Hastings, Touchstone, New York, 1988.

Based on interviews with more than 200 Americans, Canadians, British and Koreans, and even Chinese, although their stories still followed the party line. It is a very perceptive book that explains the Korean War and shows how the American mistakes in Korea were perpetuated in Vietnam. It is an excellent introduction to the Korean War, although he covers the British side of the war a bit too much, but then he is British. It is an excellent introduction to the Korean War but it is hard to avoid feeling a sense of futility when reading it.

MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero-Stanley Weintraub, Touchstone, New York, 2001.

The author served in Korea. The books only deals with MacArthur’s role in the Korean War and ends when he is relieved of command. Weintraub gives a good sense of the power of MacArthur’s image in America, how he was almost worshipped as someone greater than mortals. He also gives a detailed examination of the domestic political situation and how MacArthur’s actions were viewed in Washington. It is an extremely detailed and perceptive look at the escalation of the Korean War.

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