In late August, Major Patrick Ferguson was assigned to lead his American Volunteers and South Carolina Tory militia to guard the left flank of Cornwalis’ army as it moved towards North Carolina. Ferguson was also told to organize local Tory militia, but Cornwalis worried that Ferguson would not follow these orders because he was too aggressive. The task of training Tory militia was a difficult one, the men did not have a record of fighting well against the rebels, and would be pitted against seasoned guerrillas under excellent leaders who were extremely fast-moving.

Despite his impressive energy, Ferguson encountered the same problems training militia that Continental officers did but he relied on discipline to deal with the problem, instead of simply accepting that farmers need to take care of their farms and can not be trained like regulars.

The Over Mountain Men were pioneers who had disobeyed the British proclamation in 1763 forbidding white men from settling in Cherokee land, where Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina meet. These people had leased land from the Cherokee and then fought off the Cherokee when the Indians realized the white people intended to stay, so they were tough people, the kind that you do not want to make mad. Ferguson was not nicknamed Bulldog in recognition of his tactful nature, so he sent a message to the leaders of the Over Mountain Men telling them to not to support the rebels or he would visit their land, hang their leaders and burn their homes. Partisan leader Isaac Shelby was already trying to raise men to oppose Ferguson, so this was exactly what he needed, especially since Ferguson was burning his way close enough to actually threaten the homes of the Over Mountain Men. Already sympathetic to the rebel cause, this challenge drove several groups of the Over Mountain Men to join together under Shelby and John Sevier to seek Ferguson out and beat him before he reached their homes.

Although there were two leaders, they worked well with each other and also persuaded North Carolina and Virginia militia units to join them. Within two weeks they had raised roughly 1,040 men, who showed up with their own horses, supplies and rifles that were accurate at 200 yards. Their leaders were battle-hardened partisans and knew that they had to fight in the woods since rifles were slow to load, so they would be vulnerable to bayonet charges on open ground, which an experienced fighter like Ferguson should have known and thus refused to fight anywhere other than on open ground. They were not joined by Sumter because he was busy fighting the Governor of South Carolina, John Rutledge, who had tried to appoint another militia leader to command Sumter. As they marched further and further from their homes trying to find Ferguson, many men grew tired, so when word arrived from Sumter’s men with the location of Ferguson’s force, the men with horses were chosen to join up with Sumter’s band, and the rest were left behind. In the end, Ferguson faced roughly 960 men, evenly divided between Over Mountain Men and Back Country militia.

When deserters told Ferguson the Over Mountain Men were coming and how many there were, he decided to make his stand on King’s Mountain, even though he was only a day’s march from Cornwalis’ army. It is unclear why he did not simply lead the rebels further away from their supply line and closer to his reinforcements. If he had to fight, why did he pick a ridge surrounded by trees and undergrowth that was ideal terrain for an army of woodsmen? He also neglected to build any defensive fortifications, even though he had enough time, choosing instead to rely on bullets and steel, which seems foolish for a proponent of irregular warfare.

Ferguson had about 1,125 men but his patrols were clearly ineffective, since the rebels were able to sneak up to the edge of the camp before attacking from every side on October 7, 1780. Ferguson formed his men into line and charged the rebels, driving them down to the bottom of the ridge, but the ground was too rough to continue the charge, since the trees broke up the lines and gave the rebels shelter from which to hide and then slash with knife and tomahawk. Moreover, these rebels were made of firmer stuff than the average militia who usually broke at the first sight of bayonets, and although they were pushed down three times, they went back up each time, taking shelter in the nearby woods to snipe at the Tories, until they were forced to retreat, at which point they would restart the process again. After the last charge failed to break the rebels, it became clear that the battle was lost, and Ferguson was killed trying to break through the enemy. Even after the Tories raised the white flag, many rebels continued firing, shouting Tarleton’s Quarter as they killed the wounded, and it took some time before their commanders could make them stop.

One explanation for Ferguson’s rash decision to fight at King’s Mountain may have been that he hoped that winning an unexpected victory would gain him entry to Cornwalis’ circle of favorite officers. Instead, in the space of an hour, the army guarding Cornwalis’ left flank ceased to exist. Tory casualties were more than 300, while 698 prisoners had to endure a grueling march to the north. Rebel casualties were less than a hundred.

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