Following the battles of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, patriot leaders moved to ensure that known Tories in positions of power were either neutralized or forcibly removed from those positions. A particularly prominent Tory was Guy Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs and colonel in the Tryon County militia, therefore it was feared that he would mobilize Indians to fight for the British. Learning that rebels were planning to kill him, he fled his estate in New York in June 1775 with 250 retainers, friends and Mohawk allies. After reaching Montreal, he recruited hundreds of Indians but Guy Carleton, the governor-general of Canada, had little desire to start a savage Indian war and refused to use them. Carleton was well aware of the value of Indian allies but feared that Indian raids would end any hope of negotiations ending the conflict. When Carleton proved reluctant to accept his proposal that a combined force of Indians and Tories, with British regulars in support, invade the Mohawk Valley, Johnson and his brother-in-law Daniel Claus traveled to England in June 1776 to present their case to the British government. While waiting for an official meeting, he was introduced to Major General John Burgoyne and persuaded him that the powerful Iroquois Confederacy would fight for the British and that New York was filled with Tories.

Burgoyne was seeking an independent command where he could win glory and end the rebellion, one suspects in that order, so he embraced the plan. However, in March 1777 he was offered command of the Hudson River expedition, which was intended to follow the traditional invasion route of Lake Champlain and Lake George to capture Albany, New York and divide the American colonies in two. Desiring to ensure the success of his own venture, the number of troops assigned to the Mohawk Valley expedition was cut in half and it became a diversion intended to attract attention away from his expedition.

Sir John Johnson, Johnson’s cousin, had remained in New York where he worked secretly to raise a regiment of loyalists since the militia had come under the control of the rebels. However, his recruits were disarmed by a powerful force led by Major-General Philip Schuyler in January 1776. When Johnson was caught conspiring again in May he led almost two hundred friends and retainers across the Adirondacks. Once in Quebec, he helped drive off the remnants of the American army that had invaded Canada under Brigadier General Richard Montgomery and Colonel Benedict Arnold the previous fall. Grateful for his support, Carleton gave Johnson authority to raise two battalions of infantry, the King’s Royal Regiment of New York (nicknamed the Royal Yorkers), from loyalist refugees. Back in New York, Johnson’s remaining supporters were jailed while suspected sympathizers were forced to sign a bond pledging not to support the British. The ease with which Johnson was forced to flee New York should have served as warning that the number of Tories was fewer than claimed.

Meanwhile, Mohawk leader Joseph Brant, William Johnson’s brother-in-law, managed to recruit enough Mohawk followers to blaze trails that enabled loyalists to escape from New York to Indian territory just outside the state’s western border. Most of the loyalists ended up at Fort Niagara, where they joined Butler’s Rangers but many stayed with Brant.

The key to the Mohawk Valley was Fort Stanwix (modern day Rome, NY), which guarded the Oneida Carry, a portage between Wood Creek and the Mohawk River. As a vital link between Lake Ontario and the Hudson River, it had been an important fort during the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763) but by the spring of 1777, it was in rough shape and had a tiny garrison. Recognizing the danger of the situation, Major General Philip Schuyler sent Colonel Peter Gansevoort and several hundred Continentals to repair the fort. They arrived on May 3, 1777 and by mid-July, he learned from friendly Indians that a powerful enemy force was on its way, so the repair work was stepped up. Gansevoort was well aware that his situation was risky since a number of men had been scalped in late June and early July. The raids became progressively bolder, and when three women were attacked two hundred yards from the fort on July 27, all of the wounded and families were sent to the lower valley for safety. Fortunately, he was reinforced by two hundred Continentals on July 30.

Colonel Barry St. Leger had been chosen to lead the Mohawk Valley expedition because he had gained a good reputation during the Seven Years' War. He had fought at Louisbourg and on the Plains of Abraham but he had no experience with either the wilderness or Indians. Sir John Johnson was the deputy commander and Claus was appointed Indian Superintendent for the expedition. Despite its supporting role, the force looked impressive, at least on paper. He was given two hundred British regulars, a battalion of four hundred and twenty jagers (German light infantry), thirty artillerymen, three hundred and fifty Tory regulars of the Royal Yorkers and a hundred men from Butler’s Rangers, as well as four cannon and four mortars. The force numbered eleven hundred men, but only eighty of the jagers had arrived in time to join the force when it left Montreal on June 23.

Schuyler’s family had handled Indian affairs until they were replaced by the Johnson faction, so in the summer of 1776 Schuyler successfully convinced most of the Iroquois Confederacy, as well as tribes from the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, to remain neutral, which boded ill for the planned invasion. However, when the little army reached Oswego on Lake Ontario on July 14, eight hundred Iroquois, mainly Seneca and Mohawks, were persuaded to join the expedition after three days of drinking, feasting and handing out enormous quantities of gifts.

News of Burgoyne’s capture of Ticonderoga, the key strongpoint on Lake Champlain, encouraged St. Leger to launch the expedition on July 20 instead of waiting for heavier artillery and the rest of the jager battalion as originally planned. Although previous reports had stated that Fort Stanwix was in rough shape and was manned by a garrison of a hundred men, he learned that the garrison now numbered six hundred men. In addition, a convoy of supplies and reinforcements was expected to reach the fort soon, so an advance force of thirty regulars and two hundred Indians were sent to attack the convoy. However, they arrived on August 2, just after the supplies had been brought into the fort, so starving out the garrison was no longer an option. Also, overpowering a garrison of almost 750 Continentals would be no easy matter. Worse, the garrison had blocked Wood Creek and it would take nine days of exhausting labor to clear the obstructions and transport the artillery to the fort.

Faced with a limited range of options, St. Leger resigned himself to a siege, even though he knew it would drive his Indian allies crazy with boredom. As a traditional regular officer, he was unable to accept the idea of simply leaving a strong enough detachment to keep the garrison bottled up, and moving on with his main force into the settled areas.  

Nearby Tryon County had been alerted of the imminent invasion and on August 4 the local militia commander, Brigadier General Nicholas Herkimer, led eight hundred militiamen to relieve the fort. The next evening they camped ten miles from the fort and messengers were sent to Gansevoort saying that he should provide a diversion by sallying from the fort, which would be signaled by firing three cannon shots. Despite Herkimer’s rank, his authority was barely recognized by several of his more aggressive commanders and when no cannon shots had been heard by mid-morning, they pushed until he finally agreed to move out. Unfortunately, St. Leger had been warned by Joseph Brant’s sister and the militia blundered into an Indian ambush at Oriskany. They would have been slaughtered but a severe downpour an hour into the battle gave them time to regroup. It is unknown how many casualties the militia suffered because a detailed report was never made but estimates range from three to four hundred. The survivors made their way back to Tryon County and the attempt to relieve the fort was abandoned. Herkimer bled to death at home two weeks later.

With only seventy casualties this should have been a great victory but Gansevoort’s late sortie had managed to loot the camp, including the Royal Yorkers’ colors. Apparently, St. Leger had failed to foresee that the garrison might launch a sortie so almost all of the main force was still working away from the camp.

A couple days after the ambush, the cannon were finally moved into their fortified firing positions and it quickly became clear that the cannon were too weak to really damage the fort and the howitzers did not have enough range. Fed up with sitting around the camp, on August 7 Joseph Brant and the senior Seneca leader suggested sending a force of Indians to raid in the Mohawk Valley while the regular troops kept the garrison occupied. However, despite Johnson’s support for the plan, St. Leger refused, believing that the Indians would cause too much slaughter.  

Although St. Leger had refused to unleash the Indians, he did allow Captain Walter Butler, to take ten regulars, two Indian department officers, and several Indians and local guides, and march around the county under a flag of truce with a proclamation that everyone who did not resist would be spared when Britain retook the area. The small group of eighteen men left camp on August 13 and were captured two days later.

Despite this setback, the situation gradually began to favor the British. The steady shelling and sniping by Indians killed or wounded several members of the garrison, while others had deserted, and over a hundred loyalist militia arrived at the camp on August 15, although more than thirty soon returned home when it became clear that victory was not assured.

Schuyler was all too aware of the danger of the situation but only Benedict Arnold was willing to lead a relief expedition and he reached Fort Dayton on August 17 with seven hundred Continentals. The slaughter at Oriskany meant that he failed to recruit a force of militia, so he tried another approach. He offered to free a Tory member of Butler’s detachment who had been sentenced to death if he would go to St. Leger’s camp and say that a powerful American army was on its way. The Tory reached the camp on August 22 and relayed the story as planned.

When St. Leger announced that three hundred of his best regulars would support the Indians against the coming force, he was surprised by their lack of enthusiasm, but he should not have been since his best troops had failed to defend their camp against a sortie from the fort. It is unknown whether the Tory’s story was believed but this was the last straw for St. Leger’s Indian allies. Instead of looting, their camp had been looted, they had taken more casualties than they would have liked and three weeks into the siege little progress had been made. Their position was simple. St. Leger could either leave with them or he could stay and fight without them. Within hours it had become clear that the Indians were already moving out, so orders were given to retreat. By noon, the camp was deserted and almost all of the equipment and supplies had been abandoned. To say that it was an orderly retreat would be kind, most of the officers simply grabbed their personal possessions and left, followed by their men, who were happy to leave the place. Worse, the Indians felt they were owed plunder and took it from their former allies.  

Warned by a deserter, Gansevoort sent out a party to investigate, and the camp was looted all day long but he neglected to send any patrols to follow the retreating British, probably because he feared fighting the Indians in the forest.

To be honest, both St. Leger and Gansevoort look bad. There was no immediate danger so some if not all of the equipment could have been transported, especially since Wood Creek had been widened. At the same time, Gansevoort’s refusal to launch a sortie during the withdrawal can not only be explained by the garrison’s exhaustion.

Arnold reached the fort on August 24 and the next day he led five hundred men in pursuit of St. Leger’s force but they arrived at Lake Oneida in time to see the last of the boats disappear.

Brant and his men linked up with Burgoyne’s army on August 28. The news of St. Leger’s retreat was not welcomed by Burgoyne, especially since a large portion of his army had recently suffered a serious defeat at Bennington. While he was happy to have additional native allies, Brant did not share his optimism and used a plan to rejoin St. Leger’s force as an excuse to leave.

As news spread that the invasion of the Mohawk Valley had been cancelled, Tory supporters fled and their lands were confiscated by the rebels. At the same time, the defeat of the invasion caused many previously neutral Iroquois to join the army that Major General Horatio Gates was gathering to block Burgoyne’s advance towards Albany.

Shortly after St. Leger’s army arrived at Oswego on August 26, the remainder of the Jager battalion, 345 men, showed up. The enlarged force reached Ticonderoga on September 27, which was being attacked by a rebel army, so his initial plan to join the main expedition was postponed. However, the exhausted remnant of Burgoyne’s army was hopelessly outnumbered by this time, so he surrendered at Saratoga on October 17, so the fort was torched on November 7 and they returned to Quebec.

related m ovies:

Drums Along the Mohawk (1939)
Directed by John Ford, starring Henry Fonda and Claudette Colbert
A young couple lose their farm in the Mohawk Valley during an Indian raid at the beginning of the American Revolution. When the British and their Indian allies invade the valley, the community is forced to seek shelter in the local fort.

Further Reading:

Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777-Gavin K. Watt, research assistance by James F. Morrison, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002.

The author spent twenty-five years researching the topic and the book contains a wealth of information. Watt provides a helpful comparative chronology that shows what was happening simultaneously at Fort Stanwix and in both the St. Leger and the Burgoyne expeditions. In addition, the book offers a plethora of engravings and portraits of the leading actors and locations, as well as an impressive number of maps. Unfortunately, the narrative is slowed down by an overabundance of passages from orderly books, journals and orders of march. Used judiciously, these passages would provide a flavor of the period but there are far too many of them.

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