Howe knew that he was being recalled and refused to take aggressive action against the rebel army at Valley Forge even though the snow was melting, thus giving Washington yet another much needed breathing space. Instead, he simply waited for his replacement, Clinton, who arrived at Philadelphia on May 8, 1778. Clinton then received orders from Germain, the Secretary for the American Colonies, to withdraw to New York, send 5,000 men to attack French St. Lucia, 3,000 to Florida and other troops to Bermuda and Barbadoes. If he could not hold New York, he was to retreat to Halifax, which shows how the French alliance had completely transformed the war. Britain was no longer trying to put down a rebellion by uppity colonists, but was now struggling to preserve its global empire. Clinton did not have enough ships, so he decided to march the entire army to New York and send the loyalist supporters and much of the baggage by sea. Once in New York, he would send the various contingents to their destinations. While it may appear that Clinton was concerned about the loyalists, in the end those who went to New York had to give up their property and local connections, so this was yet another example of the British asking the loyalists to pledge allegiance to the king and then abandoning them.

Washington had three choices, stay on the defensive, attack New York or attack Philadelphia. Invading New York would prove difficult because it would involve amphibious operations, which was not the rebel army’s strong point. Besieging Philadelphia would require 20,000 troops, which he did not have, and a lot of cannon, which he also did not have. As a result, he and his senior officers decided to stay on the defensive and continue to train the army until an opportunity presented itself. Training was necessary because recruits had swelled the army to 14,000 by mid-May but they needed to be trained if they were to be able face British regulars on the battlefield. So Steuben continued the work he had begun during the winter at Valley Forge, and while he shouted in different languages at raw recruits, Washington re-arranged his officers, which was necessary since Major-General Lee rejoined the army on April 5 after being exchanged for a British general. At the same time, everybody waited for the British to do something, preferably something stupid. Exactly such an opportunity appeared when Clinton decided to march to New York.

Beginning on June 18, the army and its massive baggage train crawled from Philadelphia to New York. The army was as usual divided into two groups, one under Cornwalis and the other under Knyphausen. The troops were exhausted from marching and spread out guarding the baggage train, while progress was slow because the rebels had destroyed bridges and chopped down trees to block roads. At the same time, the surrounding area was filled with militia who sniped at foraging parties and looters, of which there were many.

Washington had 11,000 men against Clinton’s 10,000 but they moved much faster, and Horatio Gates was bringing another army down from the North. Lee was told to lead the initial attack against the British rear guard at Monmouth Court House on June 28 but he bungled the attack and caused a retreat that almost became a rout, mainly because he failed to communicate with his commanders or even explain his plan. Actually, Lee had not wanted to attack the British because he still believed that Continentals could simply not stand up to British regulars. Therefore, he wanted to isolate the British rear guard and crush it before reinforcements could arrive and provoke the full-scale battle that Washington wanted but Lee believed the rebels would lose. However, Clinton quickly grasped the danger and sent troops to cut off the rebel advance guard, so Lee sent urgent messages to his commanders countermanding his previous instructions and telling them to solidify their lines. Lee’s refusal to clearly explain his plan to his commanders before the battle meant that they had no idea what these new orders meant and mass confusion quickly developed. Not receiving clear guidance from Lee and seeing that they were outnumbered by the approaching British columns, they chose to retreat.

The withdrawal was orderly, thanks partly to Steuben’s strenuous efforts during the winter at Valley Forge, which still gave Washington little joy when he encountered the troops since moving in good order or not, they were moving in the exact opposite direction than he wanted. Washington stopped the retreat and organized a proper defense, which Clinton and Cornwalis foolishly decided to attack head on bit by bit, never in force, so the day ended with the British retreating. The British lost about 300 men at Monmouth and the Americans lost a bit more, but they had shown that they could stand up to the British. For the first time, Clinton led his men to retreat, not Washington and the American army. Washington intended to continue the battle the next day but the British moved away too quickly.

The American generals felt that Lee’s timidity had cost them a priceless opportunity but Lee claimed that his troops could not stand against British regulars and Washington’s criticism was so harsh that Lee later demanded a general court martial, which ruled against him and suspended him from command for a year. Although it was not suspected at the time, Monmouth was Washington’s last battle for the three and a half years, and that would be fought with French allies.

Further Reading:

The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778-Stephen R. Taaffe, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

Taaffe points out that although the Philadelphia Campaign was the only time when the British and American armies faced each other where neither side had an overwhelming numerical advantage, the Northern Campaign generally receives more attention because a British army surrendered at Saratoga, while the strategic situation remained essentially unchanged by the end of the Philadelphia Campaign, despite several hard-fought battles, namely Brandywine, Germantown and Monmouth Courthouse. Like almost everyone writing on this period, the author states that Howe made a strategic blunder in refusing to coordinate with Burgoyne, who was coming down from Canada along the Hudson River, which meant that Washington was free to send enough troops to first block Burgoyne and then force him to surrender at Saratoga. However, no mention is made of the personal factors that influenced his strategy, such as Howe’s unwillingness to help a rival win glory, his political influence in Parliament which prevented his official superior, Lord Germain, from simply ordering him to cooperate with Burgoyne instead of politely suggesting that he do so, and the constant criticism by his subordinates that he was more interested in drinking and his mistress than in planning a campaign, which is why Washington was given time in the winter and spring to rebuild his army. Nevertheless, it is a well-researched, informative book that explains every stage of the Philadelphia campaign, from Howe’s hesitant efforts before leaving New York to Clinton’s final, rather embarrassing departure from Philadelphia less than a year later.

Share this page with others: