Back to the War of 1812 Chronology

Even though all three invasion attempts in 1812 had been failures, the American government refused to give up its plan to conquer Canada but all efforts would be focused on the Niagara region. It was clear that whoever dominated the Great Lakes had a vital advantage, so Captain Isaac Chauncey was assigned to gain control of Lake Ontario, while Lieutenant Oliver Perry was given responsibility for Lake Erie.

The series of victories by American frigates over British frigates had produced such a torrent of public criticism that British fleet in North American waters received enough ships to both blockade the American ports and take a toll of American privateers, frequently pursuing them into coastal bays. Since most American warships were idling in port, their crews were sent to man the growing fleets on Lakes Ontario and Erie.

At the same time, Major-General Henry Dearborn was ordered to take Kingston and Forts George and Erie to ensure that the United States held both entrances to Lake Ontario. Kingston was rejected as a target because it was too strongly defended, so he decided to attack York (modern-day Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada. Actually, York’s value was entirely symbolic, while Kingston controlled one of the two entrances into Lake Ontario, which is why it was well-defended and York was not. Shortly after Chauncey’s fleet landed 1,700 American regulars at York on April 27, Major-General Roger Sheaffe and his surviving troops retreated to Kingston. Dearborn was not an active commander and when Brigadier-General Zebulon Pike was killed by the explosion of the fort’s magazine there was no one to enforce discipline. Looting began to spread and somehow the Parliament buildings were burned, so there was not much left of York when the Americans departed a week later. Sheaffe’s poor performance ensured that he was replaced by Major-General Francis de Rottenburg.

While the Americans were taking the offensive on Lake Ontario, the British were hoping to do the same at the western end of Lake Erie. Major-General Henry Proctor was hoping to receive additional regulars from Sheaffe for a campaign against Fort Meigs. The assault on York meant that those troops were needed at Niagara but Shawnee chief Tecumseh and his brother the Prophet made up for the lack of reinforcements by recruiting 400 Indians, bringing the total number of Indian allies to 1,200 by April 21, and the combined force reached Fort Meigs on April 27. Although the bombardment failed to penetrate the fort’s solid earthworks, the garrison’s long-term prospects were grim, since the fort lacked wells and food supplies were limited. A relief column of 1,200 Kentucky militiamen was ordered to attack the British batteries on the west of the fort on May 5, while the garrison launched sorties against the batteries on the other side to distract the British. The militiamen completed their mission but were lured into an ambush by Indians, which enabled Proctor’s troops to retake the batteries. Only 150 of the original 800 Kentuckians made it safely to the fort. It had been a great victory for the British since they had taken minimal casualties but most of the Indians drifted off with their plunder, and the militia needed to return for the spring planting, so Proctor had to withdraw his siege on May 9.

Learning of the attack on York, the British garrison at Kingston struck at Chauncey’s shipyard at Fort Tompkins on May 28, and even though they were driven off, the attack convinced Chauncey to abandon Dearborn in order to protect Tompkins. Meanwhile, Dearborn’s army attacked Fort George, at the north end of the Niagara River, on May 27. Brigadier-General John Vincent, the British commander, tried to stop the Americans on the beach but his troops were unable to bear the bombardment from the enemy ships. Realizing that the fort could easily be shelled into submission once the Americans controlled the area, Vincent quickly ordered a retreat to Queenston, and pulled in all of the garrisons between Fort Erie and Fort George. While Dearborn and part of the army occupied Fort Erie, Brigadier-Generals John Chandler and William Winder led 3,500 men after the Fort George garrison, reaching Stoney Creek (now part of Hamilton, Ontario) on June 5. Realizing that the American camp was badly defended, Vincent launched a night attack and captured both generals, so the American troops retreated to Fort George. When British ships appeared several days later, Dearborn elected to retreat since without Chauncey’s fleet his lines of communication were exposed and he burned the fort on June 9.

Once the armies had withdrawn, guerrillas took the stage. Raids on the area near Fort George by a small force of fifty men under Lieutenant James Fitzgibbon became so annoying that 575 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Boerstler were sent to deal with him. Laura Secord, the wife of a Canadian militia commander, overheard the plan from American officers who were staying at her home and warned the British. Fitzgibbon arranged for the Americans to be ambushed at Beaver Dams on June 24 by Caughnawaga and Mohawk Indians, who filled them with such terror that Boerstler eagerly surrendered to Fitzgibbon. Following the defeat, the garrison of Fort George refused to leave the immediate vicinity of the fort, abandoning the area to the British and their Indian allies. Dearborn’s inability to control the Niagara frontier meant that he was replaced by Major-General James Wilkinson, who was believed to have been involved in Aaron Burr’s conspiracy to separate Louisiana from the United States.

The string of American naval victories ended when the HMS Shannon defeated the USS Chesapeake outside Boston Harbor on June 1. Unlike the previous battles, the two ships were evenly matched although the Shannon was manned by a more experienced crew. The Shannon was winning the battle when the two ships became entangled but the Chesapeake’s captain was mortally wounded before he could organize a boarding party. British pride in the navy was restored and Captain Philip Broke became a national hero.

By early June there were roughly 3,000 Indian allies at Proctor’s headquarters at Amherstburg, and so many men had to be used quickly or they would eat all of the supplies. Proctor preferred to attack the American supply base on the Upper Sandusky River but the Indians insisted on Fort Meigs even though it had already resisted Proctor’s artillery. Tecumseh believed that the garrison could be lured out into ambush but its commander, Brigadier-General Green Clay, proved to be too cautious to fall into any trap. When they failed to capture a secondary target, the small Fort Stephenson, most of the Indians left for home in late August. Harrison’s strategy of building powerful forts reduced the effectiveness of Proctor’s Indian allies while the inability of British headquarters to provide sufficient supplies to feed Tecumseh’s supporters greatly weakened the Indians’ loyalty. In fact, the British were struggling to supply their own troops, so the Indians were viewed as more of a burden than an asset.

Both Perry and his opposite number, Lieutenant Robert Barclay, had thrown themselves into building ships in order to ensure naval superiority on Lake Erie. Confident that Perry’s best ships were bottled up by a sandbar at the shipyard at Presque Isle Bay, Barclay withdrew his fleet to re-supply on July 31. After Perry somehow managed to float his ships across, he was able to blockade the British fleet, so Proctor was unable to receive supplies. On September 10, Barclay tried to break through the American blockade even though his biggest ships were undermanned. The battle turned into a series of fights between individual ships as the two fleets formed themselves into parallel lines. Two hours later Perry was forced to abandon his flagship, the Lawrence, but he took command of the relatively undamaged Niagara. During the course of their duel with the Lawrence, the two main British ships had suffered enough damage that they tried to turn to present their undamaged sides to the new opponent but became entangled, which gave Perry a heaven-sent opportunity to fire point blank without fear of retribution. After twenty minutes of brutal punishment, the British squadron surrendered. Perry’s report included the soon to be famous phrase “We have met the enemy and they are ours.”

Now that Lake Erie was under American control, General William Henry Harrison was able to move against Detroit with an army of 5,500 men in late September. All too aware of the danger posed by Barclay’s defeat, Proctor abandoned both Fort Detroit and the vital shipyard at Amherstburg. Tecumseh persuaded the other Indian leaders to agree to retreat on the condition that the British would make a stand on the Lower Thames. After a large garrison was left at Detroit to re-establish American control of Michigan Territory, Harrison set off with 3,500 men to pursue Proctor, although he felt that the British must have too much of a lead to be caught. However, the rains had made travel difficult and Proctor often had to urge his Indian allies forward, since they were understandably reluctant to leave their homes. The retreat was badly planned and the number of Indians that accompanied the British fell steadily until there were less than 600, and most of the supplies and equipment had to be left behind since the ships could not make it upriver.

The desire to preserve the Indian alliance drove Proctor to delay his retreat, so when it became clear that the enemy cavalry would soon catch up, he had to fight near the Thames River on October 5 instead of at Moravian Town, 2.5 miles further north, where the high ground was much more favorable. In fact, he had intended to spend the winter there, since it could be supplied by land, but that was when he thought that he would have time to build fortifications. Proctor’s original force of 800 regulars had been whittled down by casualties, illness and capture, while most of the militia was ahead with their families. For unknown reasons, he decided to spread his 500 troops across a 250 yard wide area between the river and a marsh, which was guarded by Tecumseh’s Indians. With three feet between each redcoat, the line could easily be pierced, so Harrison’s cavalry commander recommended a cavalry charge. The British were surprised by the tactic, especially since the cavalry that had broken through were firing at their rear while the rest of Harrison’s men were attacking from the front. Without the support of the British troops, Tecumseh’s Indians were not able to hold out for long, so they were slaughtered and he was killed, although his body was never found because the Kentuckians mutilated the dead in revenge for the slaughter of their friends at Raisin River. Proctor escaped with less than 250 men and barely made it through the court martial with his rank.

The defeat of the main British force in the area secured American control of the communications line from Detroit (the western end of Lake Erie) to Sackets Harbor (the eastern end of Lake Ontario), thus cutting off the link with the British fort Mackinac on Lake Huron, while Tecumseh’s death destroyed any hope of an Indian Confederacy. However, the enlistments of many of the militiamen were almost over, so a garrison of 1,000 regulars was left to hold Michigan Territory and Harrison led the remaining 1,300 troops to Buffalo to join the offensive against Niagara.

When Major-General James Wilkinson finally arrived at Sackett’s Harbor on August 30, 1813, he was displeased to learn that only 2,000 of the 3,500 men were fit to fight. The lack of manpower was remedied by taking 1,000 men from Fort George. Concluding that Kingston was too tough, Wilkinson decided to move up the St. Lawrence to link up with Brigadier-General Wade Hampton, commander of the Lake Champlain area, and attack Montreal. However, Hampton, like most senior officers, despised Wilkinson and had little interest in cooperating closely with him. In fact, Hampton had only accepted command after he was promised to receive his orders directly from the Secretary of Defence. Hampton was moving towards Montreal but the 1,000 New York militiamen refused to cross the border and his supplies were extremely limited. He had not gone far before his route was blocked by roughly 1,500 light infantry and Canadian militia, who had prepared a series of defensive lines near the Chateauguay River, on October 26. After a short but sharp fight, he realized that he could neither outflank not penetrate the enemy lines, so he ordered a withdrawal. While his caution was laudable, his decision to call off the campaign and return home reflects his belief that it was too late in the year for an invasion of Canada.

Meanwhile, Wilkinson was leading an army of over seven thousand men towards Montreal. A British force operating in his rear threatened his supply line so two thousand men under Brigadier-General John Boyd were sent to clear them out. Since the Americans outnumbered the British by more than two to one this should have been a simple matter but when the two forces encountered each other at Crysler’s Farm on November 11, a series of professional volleys and a bayonet charge from the British regulars forced them to flee. Learning the next day that Hampton would not be linking up with him, Wilkinson settled in for winter quarters at French Mills two miles south of the Canadian-American border and then preoccupied himself with sending letters that criticized Hampton.

When 1,000 New York militiamen left because their period of enlistment had expired, the commander of Fort George, Brigadier-General George McClure, decided that his remaining 60 regulars were insufficient to hold the fort, so he retreated to Fort Niagara after burning the neighboring village in December. Revenge was not long coming. On December 18, 562 British troops and militia launched an attack on Fort Niagara that took the garrison by surprise. A hastily assembled force of militia was easily defeated the following day and the towns of Black Rock and Buffalo were torched on December 30, which showed that Harrison’s victory had done little to make the frontier more secure. In fact, as 1813 came to an end, the British still controlled almost all of their side of the frontier and had taken Fort Niagara as well. However, with only 15,000 men stretched out over a very long frontier, the British could not afford the risk of offensive operations.

Back to the War of 1812 Chronology

Further Reading:

A Wampum Denied: Proctor’s War of 1812-Sandy Antal, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997.

The author examines the war on the Detroit frontier, focusing on the efforts of first Brock and then Proctor to work with Tecumseh to forge an Indian buffer state between Canada and the United States. He shows how despite their initial military victories, Prevost, the governor general of Canada, refused to give the necessary support to accomplish this goal. Antal’s impressive research challenges the traditional view that Proctor was incompetent, suggesting instead that he was an effective general who was eventually brought down by a lack of supplies caused by American control of Lake Erie. While he admits that the judgment on Proctor’s performance is open to debate, Antal has produced an excellent examination of the Detroit front of the war and explained the difficulty of fighting so far from the main settlement in Quebec, dependent on an extremely precarious supply line. In addition to extensive footnotes, brief sketches of what happened to the main participants after the War of 1812 are also provided.

1812: War with America-Jon Latimer, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

While it is written from the British perspective, the book is a fair and surprisingly in-depth presentation of the war with very good maps. Latimer rightly points out that the desire to conquer Canada was a primary motivation for the Americans and the failure of the invasion guaranteed Canada’s independence. He explains the nuts and bolts of the British military well, including how much food and alcohol the sailors and soldiers were guaranteed respectively. The effect of privateers and the blockade on both American and British trade, and the illegal but widespread trade between Canada and New England are examined, so it is a good choice for those more interested in the economic aspect of the war. His concluding chapter summarizes how the war affected Anglo-American relations for the next generation and how the war has been viewed by American and British historians over the years.

1812: The War That Forged a Nation-Walter R. Borneman, New York: Harper Collins, 2004.

Although it is told from the American point of view, it is a good single volume account of the war that is both readable and well-researched. He provides a perceptive background to the simmering tensions that were building up before war was declared. For those confused by terms such as the weather gauge, Borneman provides brief but effective explanations of the complexities of naval battles. My sole frustration is that the maps are fine for individual campaigns but there no decent maps of the overall strategy. 

The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History-J. Mackay Hitsman (updated by Donald E. Graves), Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999.

The introduction by Graves shows that previous writing on the War of 1812 had entrenched the myth that the militia of Upper Canada with only token assistance from British regulars had repeatedly thrown back the American invaders and preserved the independence of Canada, ignoring political, diplomatic or economic aspects of the war. Therefore, the book was pretty much the first even-handed approach to the war that appeared in Canada. At the time, his respectful treatment of Prevost was considered controversial since he had previously been viewed as a dangerous incompetent. The original version did not include his references for all of the quotations and since he passed away from cancer shortly after it was published, four historians collaborated to produce references for the new edition. Hitsman provides a good explanation of the organization of the British military, the system for purchasing officer ranks and the type of people who were recruited into the army. As the title states, it is a military history and people might be put off the large amount of detail devoted to movements of troops and huge variety of units’ names, so it is best suited for the student of the era, rather than the general reader.

Share this page with others: