Seven Years' War
Quebec
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Following the victories at Louisbourg and Forts Frontenac and Duquesne, the tide was finally turning for the British, therefore it was vital to keep the pressure on the French. With this goal in mind, Major-General Jeffrey Amherst was ordered to attack Fort Carillon on the northern end of Lake George, which blocked the traditional invasion route from the English colonies to Quebec. It seems likely that Amherst’s expectations were low, since this would be the fourth time in five years that a British army was sent to eliminate that fort. The second prong was a force led by Brigadier General John Prideaux that was launched against Fort Niagara as part of an effort to eliminate the French presence in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley region. The third prong would be an attack on the heart of the enemy, Quebec City, but this would require a very talented commander.
One of Amherst’s most able subordinates during the siege of Louisbourg had been the young colonel James Wolfe. Pitt felt that Wolfe was the daring tactician he needed in North America, especially given his experience with amphibious campaigns, so he was assigned to lead an army from Louisbourg to Quebec City. Actually, Wolfe thirsted after a command on the continent because he believed it offered more glory but his promotion from colonel to major-general, skipping the rank of brigadier general, must have been of some consolation.
Wolfe faced no easy task. The campaign season in Quebec was only three months long and Quebec City was almost nine hundred miles from Louisbourg, so supply would be difficult. The St. Lawrence was dangerous for those unfamiliar with the river and an earlier British expedition had turned back after losing several ships during the fog. The problem of navigating the St. Lawrence River was solved by capturing several Canadian pilots and threatening to kill them if they did not guide the ships. Fortunately, Wolfe’s chief engineer, Patrick Mackellar, had spent several months as a prisoner in Quebec. Allowed to wander around, he had naturally carefully examined the city’s defenses, so at least Wolfe knew what to expect. Although only nine thousand troops arrived instead of the promised twelve thousand, the men were drilled mercilessly until they could enter the boats and carry out shore landings flawlessly.
Unfortunately, a later than usual spring and logistical difficulties caused Wolfe’s fleet to leave six weeks later than planned, which allowed a French fleet to bring badly needed supplies to Quebec. The ships did not bring any reinforcements despite Montcalm’s urgent requests but they did bring orders that promoted Montcalm to lieutenant general.
On June 27, Montcalm and his officers woke up to see a powerful British fleet landing men near the city. Montcalm had four thousand regular troops, one thousand Troupes de la Marine, ten thousand militia and two thousand sailors. However, while Quebec had strong walls twenty feet high and several feet thick, it did have one weakness. There was a small ridge upriver that was high enough that any cannon placed there would be able to bomb the town. Behind the ridge was an open field called the Plains of Abraham, therefore Montcalm’s chief engineer had strongly advised him to build fortifications at the ridge but once the British arrived there was no time. Montcalm was not worried that the British would try to sail upriver and take the city from behind because the tides made this difficult and the ships would have to pass Quebec’s cannon. As a result, he estimated that the British would attack across the much more narrow St. Charles River to the north of the city, so he had his men dig a line of entrenchments on the near side of the St. Lawrence River, the Beauport shore, to deny the British access to the St. Charles River. The fortifications stretched for six miles along the shore and ended at the Falls of Montmorency.
Meanwhile, the British had gained control of Ile d’Orleans and Point Levis across from the city and started bombarding the lower town on July 12, which lacked the thick walls of the upper town. Wolfe had captured the far side of the Falls of Montmorency on July 9 but even though the British army had been divided into three parts, Montcalm made no effort to cross the river and deal with them one by one. Instead, he seemed to be waiting for the Canadian winter to drive the British away, which would not be a bad strategy except that it was July. A more likely explanation was that Montcalm feared that his militia, Indian allies and Troupes de la Marine would not be able to face the British regulars on an open field.
On July 31, Wolfe launched a direct attack on the Beauport shore, despite the opposition of all of his senior commanders. Picking a relatively exposed redoubt as his target, Wolfe sent a thousand troops to attack it in order to lure Montcalm’s main force out of their defences, which would allow the rest of the British army to attack across Montmorency. When the British troops reached the redoubt they found that it was empty. Fed up with the siege they charged up to the main line and although they were taking heavy casualties victory was possible until a thunderstorm ended the battle. Half of the British troops had been killed or wounded because Wolfe had not arranged for enough support for what was only intended to be a diversionary attack.
Quebec proved to be a tough nut to crack and little progress had been made by late August. Wolfe began to despair that he would have to return to Britain a failure, although he was cheered to learn that a force under Brigadier General John Prideaux and William Johnson had captured Fort Niagara on July 26 after a several week long siege. The British had reached the fort on July 7 but even though Captain Pierre Pouchot had only 500 men against 2,000 he refused to surrender, thus forcing the British to build siege lines and gradually knock down the fort’s walls. Pouchot had such a weak garrison because he had sent away most of his troops to help defend the Ohio Valley. When a French relief force blundered into a British ambush only two miles south of the fort on July 24 and was defeated, Pouchot knew it was over and surrendered on July 26. Unfortunately, Prideaux did not live to see the surrender since he had been killed when a mortar had exploded while he was inspecting the siege lines. Soon after, the French blew up both Fort Carillon and Fort St. Frederic, which meant that the way to Quebec was now open. However, Amherst was not the boldest or the fastest commander, so even though there were several weeks of decent weather left, Amherst chose to strengthen his control of the area, rather than move north, which meant that Wolfe was on his own.
On August 4, a British force was sent to raid the area upriver from the city, which led Montcalm to send Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville with 3,000 men to patrol the area, thus dividing his army. Repeated British raids upriver had convinced Montcalm to send Bougainville’s force too far away to easily reinforce the city.
The siege took its toll on both sides. The British continued to bombard the lower town while French and Canadian militia routinely ambushed British patrols. Worse, the number of British sick grew as the siege continued. A direct attack on the French defensive lines was essentially suicide and he knew it, but there appeared to be no other method. Actually, his senior officers strongly suggested cutting the supply line between Quebec City and Montreal in the hope of forcing the French out of their lines but they only managed to convince Wolfe to abandon any plan of attacking the Beauport Line.
He finally gave up and withdrew his forces back to Point Levis and Ile d’Orleans on September 3. The temperature would drop considerably in less than a month and he had already lost a tenth of his original force. Wolfe had one single advantage, his fleet had gained control of the river, which meant that he could move troops faster by water than Montcalm could by land. It took him a week to find a potential landing spot upriver from the city, where a rough but usable path led to the Plains of Abraham. Montcalm had left a small guard there but they were not dug in so they could be dealt with. Actually, Wolfe could have landed at Pointe aux Trembles which was also lightly guarded and would enable Wolfe to block Quebec’s supply line with Montreal. Instead, he selected a hazardous landing area and a climb up a steep cliff.
The landing took place on the early morning of September 13 and it was made easier by a stroke of luck. A French deserter had told the British that supply boats were expected that night so the advance British troops were able to get to the landing site unopposed by pretending to be French. Once the French guards realized they were under attack it was too late and they were soon defeated.
By 8 AM, Wolfe’s entire force of 4,000 men and two small cannon had reached the top, and the British were forming up on the edge of the Plains of Abraham. Montcalm had learned of the British move at dawn and immediately led the majority of his troops (4,500 men) to face the British, reaching the Plains at 9AM. The problem was that Wolfe clearly had all of his army while Montcalm’s men were arriving slowly. If he waited too long, the British would dig in but if he retreated, the units moving to the rear would run into the units advancing and the resulting confusion could prove deadly. He knew that Bougainville was behind Wolfe with three thousand men but he did not know when Bougainville would arrive. It turned out that Bougainville only learned of the British arrival at 9 AM, by which time it was too late.
What has not been explained is why Montcalm led his army against the British line instead of simply digging in and having the British come to him, like he had done against Abercromby at Fort Carillon the previous year. This is especially true since time was on his side because Bougainville’s arrival would have completely transformed the battlefield. Even if the British had managed to drag heavy guns up to the ridge behind the Plains, it seemed doubtful that it could be done in time to force the city to surrender before winter would cause the British fleet to sail away.
Montcalm launched his attack at 10AM and had his militia and Indians threaten the British flanks while his regulars were in the center. He had no confidence in the militia so he had not taken the time to train them and he paid the price. The French line quickly became irregular as the militia was unable to keep pace with the regulars. The British waited calmly and fired a volley at forty yards, which forced the French to retreat. Both commanders were hit repeatedly. Wolfe died on the battlefield but lived long enough to know that he had won. Montcalm died that night, happy that he would not live long enough to see the English in Quebec.
Bougainville arrived just after the French had safely re-entered Quebec City but did not take the time to carefully examine the situation and was quickly driven off by the British. Each side had lost roughly 600-700 troops.
Vaudreuil led the survivors to Montreal and command of the Quebec garrison fell to Jean de Ramezay, who knew that he could not hold Quebec City and feared the carnage of it was taken by assault, especially if the British took revenge for Fort William Henry. Command of the British force had fallen to Brigadier General George Townshend and he knew that he could not play hardball since Bougainville still had a sizeable force and the British fleet had to sail soon or be trapped by the ice. Townshend had no desire to freeze outside the city so he gave generous terms and the French garrison surrendered on September 17. Once again, holding out even for a short while would have given Bougainville time to link up with the garrison of Montreal and the combined army might have been able to beat the British force.
The British soon discovered that Quebec was no prize since their bombardment had turned the city into something only slightly better than ruins. Meanwhile, Bougainville moved his army between Quebec and Montreal, where he was joined by the Chevalier de Levis with troops from Montreal. Realizing that there was no hope of retaking Quebec, he retreated to Montreal to wait for spring and a chance to retake the city. Townshend was too preoccupied preparing for the winter to pursue the French. Actually, most of the senior officers decided they would rather spend the winter in England so James Murray became the senior general, while Wolfe became a hero in England.
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Empires At War: The Seven Years’ War and the Struggle for North America 1754-1763-William M. Fowler Jr., Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2005.
The first chapter concisely explains the political situation in Europe and how conflict was brewing in North America despite the vast distances between the French and British colonies. The portraits of the main participants and contemporary paintings of the notable battles and forts are interesting but no replacement for actual maps. Admittedly, the footnotes give the modern locations of the places mentioned in the narrative but simply looking at modern maps does not give any sense of the scale of distance covered and just how empty the disputed areas were. Fowler also never details the specific number of casualties after each battle. As the title states, it focuses on the struggle for North America and spends little time explaining the situation in Europe. However, it is an excellent introduction to a conflict that set the stage for the American Revolution.
The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America-Walter R. Borneman, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006.
Borneman devotes more time to an aborted plan of union between the colonies than to the initial fight that started the war and Washington’s surrender at Fort Necessity. He excels at explaining the economic aspect of the war and makes Pitt’s global vision easily understood. Although specific numbers of casualties for each battle are provided, some of his explanations of battles are better than others, which I suspect reflects whether they are considered important or not. Pontiac’s rebellion is examined in good detail and shows how Pontiac’s leadership role has been overstated. The years immediately following the end of the war are covered to show how the frustration of not being able to settle the captured French lands combined with heavy taxes drove the colonists to revolt. Finally, he briefly plays the what-if game, while never forgetting that the game is both fascinating and pointless. Above all, he shows how the war transformed the kingdom of Great Britain into the British Empire. Oh, it has great maps.
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