Texan Revolution
San Jacinto
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All across Texas, columns of Texian refugees fled Santa Anna’s army, leaving a trail of abandoned goods and homes full of possessions in what came to be known as the Runaway Scrape. Meals were left unfinished on tables, such was the panic that spread through the infant republic at the news that Santa Anna was approaching with his army. Lacking enough provisions and horses, people walked and a number of children died from the harsh conditions. The rebel government preoccupied itself with moving east as fast as possible rather than organizing the general evacuation although it found time to play the blame game with Sam Houston over who was responsible for starting the retreat.
Like almost everyone else in Texas, Houston had been taken by surprise by the suddenness of Santa Anna’s advance, but he was initially not concerned because he thought that he had an army, he simply needed to pull in the scattered units. Unfortunately, he was not given enough time to pull them in. The destruction of the garrison of the Alamo and the execution of the much larger garrison at Goliad and the members of the expedition to Matamoros meant that roughly seven hundred men had been killed in three weeks. The situation went from dangerous to catastrophic when large numbers of men left to protect their families and many of the mercenaries who had come in hope of land also deserted, so his army dropped from a peak of 1,400 men to 400-500 men. Despite steady criticism from the president, his senior officers and pretty much everyone else, Houston led his army east towards Louisiana in the hope of dragging the US army into the rebellion. Fortunately for the rebellion, the Mexican troops pursuing Houston were led by General Ramirez y Sesma, who was not the most aggressive leader.
As a protégé of President Andrew Jackson, Houston knew that Jackson wanted an excuse to intervene but it had to be a good excuse with a legal basis. Although Jackson had been trying to buy Texas from Mexico for some time, he was unwilling to officially recognize the rebels or give them money because it would mean war with Mexico, which would give Britain, France and Spain the opportunity to interfere. However, he had sent General Edmund Pendleton Gaines, who shared Jackson’s belief that the best defence was an offence, to command the troops in West Louisiana on the border with Texas. While his orders stressed the neutrality of the US, Gaines was also told to prevent Indian raids into Mexico, which was simply a cover for a possible invasion of Mexico, since the Mexican army was able to deal with any such raids on its own. Messages took a week to travel from Washington to the frontier and a lot could happen in a week, so Jackson had plausible denial.
Gaines began preparing carefully by calling out all of the militias near the region in order to build up his force to an army of eight to twelve thousand soldiers, which would have only one purpose, the invasion of Mexico. He also transferred veteran troops fresh from fighting the Seminoles in Florida to the Louisiana border. As justification for requesting two to three battalions of militia each from Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee, Gaines claimed that a Mexican agent was stirring up trouble among the Caddo Indians, who were on the other side of the Sabine River. However, the governors of Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi believed that Gaines’ request was simply part of a scam to help Texan land speculators and refused to send troops.
A former Jackson appointee named John Mason, who had joined the Texan rebels, sent messages to Gaines warning of the impending massacre of the thousands of refugees packed on the west bank of the flooded Sabine River. This gave Gaines the excuse he needed, so thirteen companies were sent across the river on April 14 but unfortunately the troops saw no sign of an imminent Indian uprising. Actually, the Caddos were convinced that the rebels would kill them, so they had all fled, which was very inconvenient for Gaines since it deprived him of his excuse of hot pursuit. He still stayed on the other side of the Sabine River, claiming that his continued presence was a warning to the Caddos.
Houston felt that his army could only handle one battle, so he continued to lure the Mexican army east, further from their supplies and closer to Gaines. His caution was understandable since risking a battle against an enemy who killed all prisoners was suicidal unless you knew that you would win. Actually, not everyone criticized Houston for retreating. The secretary of state believed that if Houston’s army reached the Louisiana border, it would receive huge numbers of volunteers from the US army, enough to decisively defeat the Mexican army. This was true, since a large number of Gaines’ troops (the number is debatable but estimates range from less than a hundred to several hundred men) did desert in uniform to Houston’s army and they were later allowed to return without any questions being asked. While it is unknown how many US soldiers joined the rebels, Houston’s army had grown to 1,500 men by early April.
When Houston refused to fight a numerically inferior Mexican force under General Ramirez y Sesma on March 25, he was almost overthrown. However, he knew that even if his men won the first battle, there were still several other armies waiting under Generals Gaona, Urrea and Santa Anna. He dealt with the two most mutinous company commanders by assigning them to cover the river crossing at the Brazos and they held off Santa Anna’s army for a couple of days before he found another crossing, which gave Houston time to drill the men. Fortunately, he won over Secretary of War Thomas Rusk when he arrived on April 4, which greatly reduced the degree of government interference. The situation also improved on April 13 when he received two cannon that had been forged in Cincinnati and were immediately named the “Twin Sisters”.
Santa Anna felt that the rebellion was almost completely crushed and he was worried about maintaining his hold on power in Mexico City but he also knew that General Jose Urrea was getting all of the glory, so he needed to inflict the final defeat. Santa Anna barely missed capturing the rebel government at New Washington, and his need for glory was so strong that he planned to cut off Houston by leaving the main army behind and pressing on with the 750 men of the vanguard.
At the same time, Houston knew that he could continue towards Nacogdoches where the US troops were or go to Harrisburg and meet Santa Anna head on. Actually, he had no choice, the men burned with the desire to avenge the massacres at the Alamo and Goliad, so they would have mutinied if he retreated. Several accounts state that the men at the front of the column simply made the decision for him by turning right towards Harrisburg instead of waiting for orders. The refugees continued on to Nacogdoches and were escorted by four hundred men under Wiley Martin, one of Houston’s most mutinous officers. Once he knew that he had to fight, Houston pushed his men hard, leaving his wounded and baggage behind in order to reach his preferred battlefield before Santa Anna did. Houston picked an area blocked on both sides by swamps with the San Jacinto River at the rear so that retreat was impossible and then he concealed his army of 800 men in the forest to wait for Santa Anna, who arrived on April 20.
After a short artillery duel Santa Anna’s sole cannon was destroyed but Houston kept his men dug in and refused to let them charge, hoping that if Santa Anna was unaware of the true size of his force, he could be lured into a rash attack. Unfortunately, his men could not be restrained and a reconnaissance by a small group of cavalry turned into a short battle when a large portion of the infantry rushed to support the cavalry. Although the rebels’ casualties were minor, the enemy now knew the true size of the rebel army. Houston had refused to allow the rest of the men join the fight and he was harshly criticized by his officers that evening because they worried that the Mexicans would be reinforced by General Martin Perfecto de Cos who was nearby, which would end their numerical superiority. To be fair, the idea of badly trained militia attacking experienced troops who were dug in was a recipe for disaster. Fortunately for Houston, Santa Anna decided to have his men camp with Peggy Lake behind them so they could not retreat, although his long-suffering senior officers were far from happy with this situation. As the rebels had feared, the Mexicans were reinforced the next day by 400 troops led by General Cos but the men were raw recruits because Santa Anna had neglected to specify that Cos bring veteran troops.
The night and the next morning passed without any movement by the rebels, so the Mexican troops had a nice siesta after the noon meal, believing that no one would dare cross in broad daylight the five hundred yards of exposed area that separated the forest from their camp. The Mexicans were exhausted because they had marched all day and spent much of the night building defenses only to wake up to the bright glare of the sun, so they fell into a deep sleep. The rebels were in the cool shade of the forest, burning with the desire to fight, so Houston knew he had to let them fight or they would go on their own. He began assembling his troops at 3:30 PM and they were organized by 4PM. He also had the nearby Vince’s Bridge torn down to cut off Santa Anna’s retreat and deny him further reinforcements.
The rebels were not noticed by the sleeping Mexican army because no pickets had been posted, so the army was able to march across the field unseen. Houston and the officers were able to ensure that the men waited until they were forty yards away from the Mexican camp before firing. The rebels’ two cannon opened up at 200 yards and since they were loaded with chopped up horseshoes, they ripped through the slumbering Mexicans. This was the signal for the rebels to fire at will and then they charged like demons. Their ferocity was rumored to be due to the massive consumption of corn whiskey. The Mexicans must have thought that they had woken up in Hell but they fought back and Houston had two horses shot out from under him.
One of the rebels’ cannons blew open a hole in the Mexican breastworks and they poured into the camp screaming “Remember Goliad. Remember the Alamo!” It would have taken steady troops indeed to face such a situation but Cos’ 400 raw recruits were understandably unprepared, so at that point Mexican troops started dropping their weapons and running away. The battle only lasted eighteen minutes and then the butchery started.Attempts at surrender proved futile and the slaughter of unarmed Mexican troops lasted for several hours as rebel officers were unable or unwilling to control their men.
In the end, 9 rebels and 630 Mexicans died, among them General Manuel Fernandez Castrillon, who had tried to save rebel soldiers at the Alamo. Houston attempted to stop the killing but finally gave up. Secretary of War Rusk managed to save a group of 400 Mexicans and a total of 730 prisoners were still alive at the end of the day. Santa Anna was captured seven miles from the camp and was spared by Houston to everyone’s surprise. Some conspiracy theorists believe that Houston had spared him because they were both Masons but another possible explanation was the opium prescribed by his doctor for his wounded ankle. Most likely, Houston was worried that the rest of the Mexican army could easily destroy his exhausted rabble of an army, so Santa Anna was easily persuaded to order his army to leave Texas in exchange for his life. Santa Anna signed the Treaties of Velascoe on May 1, which were illegal according to international law since they were signed under duress but Santa Anna could not go back on his own signature.
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The Alamo (2004)
Directed by John Lee Hancock, starring Dennis Quaid and Billy Bob Thorton
As Santa Anna’s army advances deep into Texas to crush the young republic, General Sam Houston sends a small force under Colonel Travis to hold the Alamo long enough for him to organize a proper army. Joined by volunteers led by Jim Bowie and Davy Crockett, the men find themselves facing hopeless odds but refuse to surrender. Lacking enough troops, Houston refuses to relieve the Alamo and leads the Mexican army deeper into Texas where he wins a huge victory at San Jacinto. (please click here to read the review)
Duel of Eagles: The Mexican and US Fight for the Alamo-Jeff Long, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1990.
It is simply an excellent book that covers the entire Texan War of Independence and punctures pretty much every myth about Texan independence. Brief yet insightful biographies introduce all of the major participants. The final chapter quickly covers the Republic’s short history and the Mexican War that followed the American annexation of Texas but focuses more on the tragic lives of Travis’ slave Joe and Susannah Dickinson, as well as the further misadventures of Santa Anna. Long’s writing is entertaining although occasionally a bit too melodramatic, which was probably the result of reading so many diaries filled with florid language. I imagine a great number of Texans must have been offended when his book came out.
Lone Star Rising: The Revolutionary Birth of the Texas Republic-William C. Davis, New York: Free Press, 2004.
A surprisingly long section of the book is an in-depth look at the Mexican revolution and previous attempts by American filibusters and other foreign schemers, including the Lafitte syndicate, to seize control of Mexico that took place during the chaos of the revolution. The infighting among American filibusters, the Lafitte syndicate, former followers of Napoleon, and Mexican revolutionaries makes for fascinating reading. Another lengthy chapter is devoted to the story of Austin’s land grants and the development of legitimate colonies, where the colonists learned to depend on themselves. I am pleased that Davis does not just compare the Mexican Revolution to the American Revolution but also to the revolutions in Central and South America, which is a more valid comparison. However, no mention is made of the steady drinking that accompanied the majority of decisions during the Texan revolution and he fails to make the main actors come to life. Unfortunately, the detailed examination of the background and situation in Mexico means that the battle for the Alamo is covered in a single chapter. Davis also gives some credence to the hallowed myth that Bowie and Travis decided to hold the Alamo to buy time for Houston to build an army, believing that it is an important part of Texan history.
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