Washington chose Valley Forge as a winter camp because it was close enough to allow him to keep an eye on Howe’s army in Philadelphia. Washington wanted a winter campaign, probably because he wanted to repeat the victory at Trenton that he had won the previous winter. However, the majority of his senior officers strongly opposed the idea because the army urgently needed rest and more supplies. Most important, the strategic situation had changed, instead of a series of posts scattered across New Jersey, the British army was in a well-defended city.

The army reached Valley Forge in late December 1777 and once again the men froze and starved. Americans are justly proud of the soldiers who survived the bitterly cold winter at Valley Forge, but they would not be so proud of the nearby farmers who preferred to sell their cattle and produce to the British in Philadelphia, who paid in gold, unlike Congress who paid in Continental dollars and, worse, slowly. Meat was rare, vegetables almost non-existent and the soldiers wore the same clothes day after day without washing them because they lacked kettles to produce soap, so disease spread through the camp. By mid-February the men were basically starving, many soldiers had died of sickness, and large numbers of men had deserted, although most of the army stayed despite the horrible conditions. As a result, Washington was forced to send out foraging parties that seized provisions, and while they always gave a receipt, this must have been little comfort to families who had barely enough as it was.

Fortunately for the revolution, Howe once again missed an opportunity to cripple the rebel army and stayed warm and snug in Philadelphia, the most developed city in America at the time. The British soldiers gambled, drank and whored. The officers gambled, attended dramatic performances and dances, drank and courted local women of loose virtue or whored with more expensive whores. In fact, there was so much gambling that quite a few experienced officers had to sell their commissions to pay off their debts, which hurt the army since their replacements rarely had as much experience, if any. By the end of the winter, the British army was in worse shape despite its supposed period of rest.

The British were so willing to relax because they knew that Washington’s army was starving but Howe had no desire to actually take advantage of the rebels’ weak situation. He claimed that Valley Forge’s defenses were too strong but he never sent strong patrols to actually probe the defenses. It is unknown whether the starving men at Valley Forge could have fought off a British attack but it was Howe’s duty to find out. However, since he had already submitted his second request to be relieved, he had basically given up on the war.  

Howe would not have been so relaxed if he knew that a pivotal change was taking place in the Continental Army that winter. Frederick William Augustus Henry Ferdinand, Baron von Steuben, a former Prussian captain and current soldier of fortune, arrived in February and began teaching the troops how to drill and march. Most of the men at Valley Forge were veterans of numerous battlefields and knew the value of drill, so they embraced Steuben’s instruction. Furthermore, they were dedicated soldiers, otherwise they would not be freezing at Valley Forge. Steuben quickly realized that he did not have time to teach the soldiers the complete European drill, so he distilled the complex movements into a simple series that would enable the soldiers to do certain things very well. He began with a 100-man model company, and worked through translators. Steuben was not a patient man so the first English words that he learned were all swear words but that simply endeared him to the hard-bitten veterans. Within a few weeks he had trained enough drill instructors to oversee the training of the army as a whole.  

The commissary and quartermaster were still going through growing pains but by March the troops were fed and clothed. In addition, hundreds of deserters returned in the spring along with hundreds of volunteers, just in time to receive drill instruction, so the entire camp was soon filled with marching men. The British army would come to regret leaving the rebels alone that winter.

Books:

The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778-Stephen R. Taaffe, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

Taaffe points out that although the Philadelphia Campaign was the only time when the British and American armies faced each other where neither side had an overwhelming numerical advantage, the Northern Campaign generally receives more attention because a British army surrendered at Saratoga, while the strategic situation remained essentially unchanged by the end of the Philadelphia Campaign, despite several hard-fought battles, namely Brandywine, Germantown and Monmouth Courthouse. Like almost everyone writing on this period, the author states that Howe made a strategic blunder in refusing to coordinate with Burgoyne, who was coming down from Canada along the Hudson River, which meant that Washington was free to send enough troops to first block Burgoyne and then force him to surrender at Saratoga. However, no mention is made of the personal factors that influenced his strategy, such as Howe’s unwillingness to help a rival win glory, his political influence in Parliament which prevented his official superior, Lord Germain, from simply ordering him to cooperate with Burgoyne instead of politely suggesting that he do so, and the constant criticism by his subordinates that he was more interested in drinking and his mistress than in planning a campaign, which is why Washington was given time in the winter and spring to rebuild his army. Nevertheless, it is a well-researched, informative book that explains every stage of the Philadelphia campaign, from Howe’s hesitant efforts before leaving New York to Clinton’s final, rather embarrassing departure from Philadelphia less than a year later.

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